

293054

JPRS 84205

26 August 1983

Near East/South Asia Report

No. 2809

19980911 101

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

5
76
A05

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

26 August 1983

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

No. 2809

CONTENTS

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

- Turkey Reportedly Reacts in Paris to Armenian Terrorism
(ALIK, 28 Jul 83)..... 1

ARAB AFRICA

EGYPT

- State of Sugar Industry Examined
(Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Al, et al., AKHIR SA'AH,
No 2536, 1 Jun 83)..... 2

LIBYA

- Massive Petrochemical Project at Ra's al-Unuf Surveyed
(AL-MUNTIJUN, 18 Jun 83)..... 9

MOROCCO

- Ali Yata Interviewed on PPS Third Congress, Party Strategy
(Ali Yata Interview; LAMALIF, No 147, Jun-Jul 83)..... 22

SUDAN

- Integration Projects Discussed
(Umar Ahmad Mar'i; AKHBAR AL-YAWM, 28 May 83)..... 25
- Magnitude, Strengths, Weaknesses of Opposition Examined
(Ayidah al-'Azab Musa; AL-AHALI, 11 May 83)..... 28

ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

ISRAEL

Briefs

Sabbath Busing Controversy	33
New Gas Drilling Sites	33
Exports to Far East	34
No Jets at Elat	34
Industrial Exports Down	34

SOUTH ASIA

IRAN

Functions of Guards Ministry, War, Tudeh Party, Kurdistan (Mohsen Rafiqdust Interview; KEYHAN, 28 Jul 83).....	36
Minister Discusses Public Health Issues, Medical Plans (KEYHAN, 25 Jul 83).....	47
IRP Organ Claims Red Cross Official Was Engaged in Espionage (JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI 27 Jul 83).....	50
Government Exerts Efforts To Solve 'Bread Problem' (KEYHAN, 14, 18 Jul 83).....	53
Measures To Eliminate Bread Shortage Execution for Hoarders, Profiteers	
Water, Power Shortages Attributed to Increased Consumption (ETTELA'AT, 27 Jul 83).....	56

PAKISTAN

U.S. Accused of Profiting From Preparing for Global Conflicts (Aslam Abbasi; AMN, 22 Jun 83).....	59
Editorial Notes Indian 'Cunning,' American 'Weakness' (Editorial; NAWA-I-WAQT, 17 Jul 83).....	62
Elections Including Political Parties Urged (AMN, 17 Jul 83).....	63
Editorial Hits Inconsistent Jailing, Expulsion of Politicians (Editorial; JANG, 20 Jul 83).....	65

True Democratic Elections Needed To Avoid Replay of History (AMN, 15 Jul 83).....	67
MRD, People's Party Criticized for Anti-Pakistan Policies (Chaudhary Abdul Hamid; NAWA-I-WAQT, 11 Jul 83).....	69

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

TURKEY REPORTEDLY REACTS IN PARIS TO ARMENIAN TERRORISM

Tehran ALIK in Armenian 28 Jul 83 p 1

[Article: "Turkey Counteracts"]

[Text] A powerful bomb exploded yesterday at approximately 4 a.m. at the Armenian Community Center in the Paris suburb of Alfortville, which has a sizable Armenian population, causing heavy damage to the Community Center.

At approximately 10 o'clock that evening another bomb exploded in the courtyard of the Paris Armenian Community Center, slightly injuring one person.

Both cultural centers belong to the French affiliate of the Armenian Revolutionary Dashnaksutiun.

Turkey is taking countermeasures, choosing as its target Armenian community centers and innocent Armenians. These criminal acts are execrable, just as was the planting of a bomb by the Turkish airline counter at Paris Orly Airport on 15 July, which killed seven and injured more than 60 persons.

Is Turkey going to justify its actions before world public opinion by making reference to the action perpetrated by the "Secret Army" at Orly Airport?

The fascist government of Turkey could not justify these inhuman actions if it were faced only by the favorable public opinion generated by righteous revolutionary acts attacking government buildings and diplomats.

The "Secret Army" offers Turkey justifiable pretexts; how happy Ankara must be....

8817

CSO: 4605/112

STATE OF SUGAR INDUSTRY EXAMINED

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2536, 1 Jun 83 pp 24, 25

[Interview with Engineer Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Al, director of the sugar plants in Qus; Engineer 'Abd-al-Fattah; and Engineer Fathi al-Wazir, deputy minister of agriculture and president of the agricultural sector in Qina by Muhammad 'Ali al-Sayyid: "The Problem of Sugar and Sugar Cane: 10 Years Ago Egypt Was Exporting Sugar; Now We Are Importing It; Why?"]

[Text] In the early seventies we used to export sugar. In 1970 and in 1971 we produced about 60,000 tons more sugar than we consumed. We began importing sugar in 1973. We began by importing 100,000 tons of sugar. Sugar imports continued to rise until they reached 400,000 tons. How did that happen? This is the question that the story of the sugar industry in Egypt answers after average per capita sugar consumption rose from 13 kilograms to 26 kilograms. What exactly is the problem, and how do we provide the sugar we need from local production?

We took many questions to officials in the sugar industry, and their answers were quite interesting.

The sugar industry, most of whose plants are located in the governorate of Qina, is at a momentous crossroads that is forging the beginning of important things. It is forging a new urban life more than 700 kilometers from the capital over a residential area of 260 kilometers--the length of the governorate of Qina. This role which the sugar industry is playing is affecting the industry which has not yet been able to eliminate some of the area's problems. These are problems that affect the availability of sugar cane, the raw material for the industry. The sugar industry is also playing another important part that is imposed on it by Egypt's general conditions of manpower shortage. It is being compelled to introduce automation in agriculture and in some steps in the industry so that it can set us on the start of a new road.

Seven Sugar Plants

At the outset I found out from Engineer Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Al, director of the sugar refinery in Qus that the sugar company had 16 plants: 7 of those plants produce sugar from sugar cane, and four of them are located in the governorate of Qina. These are the plants in Naja' Hamadi, in Dishna, in Qus and in Aramant. The company's annual sugar production as a whole is 680,000 tons. It would be

possible to produce 100,000 tons of sugar more than what is being produced now if the necessary quantities of sugar cane were available.

Ten Times the Sugar Cane

There are production lines in the plants at Dishna, Qus and Kawm Umbu that can produce that [amount]. At the outset, however, we have to know that we get the quantity of sugar that we produce from 10 times the quantity of sugar cane. For example, the 680,000 tons of sugar we produce every year are produced from 6,800,000 tons of sugar cane.

This means that the Qus plant, for example, needs a quarter million tons of sugar cane to produce 25,000 tons of sugar. To complete the basic capacity of the plant, which was determined to be 1.5 million tons of sugar cane for the plant's three production lines, each of which was designed to handle half a million tons of sugar cane, approximately 6,000 new feddans will have to be planted with sugar cane. This is in addition to the land that is now cultivated with sugar cane and is on contract with the plant. This is a matter which requires that farmers be persuaded to plant sugar cane and that they be offered easy terms. Efforts must be made to solve labor shortage problems by introducing automation in agriculture even though such automation requires investments. This would be besides the transportation facilities that are offered by the company. In the governorate of Qina attempts must also be made to compete with competing crops like tomatoes so as to provide the necessary areas for the cultivation of sugar cane.

Half a Million for Dishna

The Dishna plant was established in 1977. It was designed to have two production lines, with each line, as I said, operating on half a million tons. However, only one production line at the plant is operating because of irrigation problems and social problems that have to do with revenge. Security considerations in the area preclude the cultivation of sugar cane in some areas to eliminate crime in those areas. This is because our problems have to do with civilization in the area. However, I think this is a problem that will end with time and soon because a percentage of the population is associated with the plants. This could change the picture of society, and that actually happened in Qus after the plant was established there in 1968. Therefore, the Dishna plant can add 50,000 tons to its current production so that if it were to operate at full capacity, its basic capacity would amount to 100,000 tons of sugar.

The Kawm Umbu plant is also operating at 85 percent capacity. It can produce 20,000 more tons of sugar.

Thus, if the raw materials were available, our plants can produce 100,000 tons more sugar. And here we must also know that there is a line beyond which sugar cane cannot be cultivated. This line ends at the governorate of Bani Suwayf because sugar cane is affected by climate and requires high temperatures.

This figure represents one fourth of our annual imports which this year amounted to 400,000 tons.

[Question] But we used to export sugar in the seventies. How did that happen?

[Answer] This is true. In 1970 and 1971 we produced more sugar than we consumed--about 60,000 tons more--and we exported that [surplus]. In 1972 that [surplus] figure began to drop to 57,000 tons. In 1973 we began importing sugar; we imported 100,000 tons. We continued to import sugar, and we are now importing 400,000 tons of sugar. [We are importing more sugar] because our annual consumption of sugar amounted to 1,100,000 tons. This is due to the increase in the average per capita consumption of sugar in Egypt, rising from 13 kilograms in the seventies to 26 kilograms at the present time. In other words average per capita consumption of sugar has doubled. This is due to the rising standard of living whose effects are immediately evident in the average per capita consumption of sugar. In Europe average per capita consumption of sugar is 30 kilograms, and in the United States it is 40 kilograms.

30 Kilograms by the Year 2000

We expect average per capita consumption of sugar to reach 30 kilograms by the year 2000. When we know that average population reports indicate that our population [will be] 66 million persons, we find that [by then], we will need a total of 2 million tons of sugar. Therefore, you find us engaged in a production war to make up for this quantity so we can avoid importing sugar or reduce the volume of sugar imports. We find ourselves faced with a difficult choice: implementing projects or importing [sugar]. Every project that is not implemented or that is delayed means that we will have to import.

New Projects

Among these projects is one in which we will try to complete the idle capacity in existing plants. In 4 years we expect to produce 180,000 tons more sugar. This will be in the context of the 5-Year Plan which will end in 1986. A production line in Abu Qarqas will be added in that plan; it will yield 75,000 tons. A production line in Jirja will yield 75,000 tons. A production line in the Delta plant, which will produce sugar from beets, will yield 100,000 tons. A production line in al-Nubariyah West will yield 50,000 tons. The National Company will yield 70,000 tons from corn sugar which will be imported from the United States.

In 1986 a second production line will be added to the Jirja plant; it will yield 75,000 tons of sugar. A plant in Asyut yields 100,000 tons and another in Bani Suwayf yields the same quantity. We would thus have used up all the sugar cane resources there. There is a second production line in al-Nubariyah West to produce sugar from sugar beets; it yields 50,000 tons. There is an idea [to build] one plant in al-Humul east, another west of the Suez Canal, and another in the North Delta. Each plant would yield 100,000 tons. There is [also] an idea [to build] three plants for corn syrup in Alexandria; each plant would have a capacity of producing 70,000 tons.

This makes it evident, as I said, that this is a war of production and consumption. The alternative for each project that is not implemented would be to import.

Sugar Cane Is Convenient and Profitable

[Question] But isn't the fact that farmers refrain from cultivating sugar cane due to the fact that sugar cane is not a very profitable crop? Isn't it also due

to what has been published about sugar cane delivery prices? Some things have also been said about the smut that spread in the sugar cane. All this raises yet another question about the future of these projects that have been proposed for the future.

[Answer] Actually, the cultivation of sugar cane is not costly. In fact, it is profitable. The problem, however, as I said, has to do with some social problems, and it has to do with the large returns that farmers in the administrative district of Qina get from the tomato crop. Ultimately, however, sugar cane is better because it is quite convenient for farmers. It stays in the ground for about 4 years, and the only attention it needs during that period is that of fertilizing and weeding the soil. Unfortunately, this is something that many farmers neglect. If they were to fight those weeds, they would increase the crop by an average of 5 tons. The present average yield here is 39 tons. A feddan cultivated with sugar cane costs 400 pounds and yields 680 pounds a year. This means that a feddan produces on the average a profit of 280 pounds. This is a good profit, particularly when we know that there are serious attempts to provide automation for the cultivation of sugar cane to solve the problem of labor shortage and the high cost of labor. Thus the yield per feddan and the sugar cane crop would soon be larger. An investment company for agricultural automation financed by the Japanese with favorable terms was established in Aswan; it services the crop until it is harvested.

Standardizing Prices

This is in addition to the solution that was determined this year: that of standardizing the price of sugar cane for all farmers and making that price 17.30 pounds per ton. In the past the price of sugar cane was determined according to the sugar content of the sugar cane. We would take a sample of the sugar cane, press it, test it, determine its sugar content and, accordingly, set the price for it. However, an agreement has been reached to standardize the price and to pay for the sugar cane by weight after deducting [from the gross weight] a certain percentage for leaves and mud in order to cut down the ratio of sugar that is lost in surplus sugar cane refuse. Every day there is an additional sugar cane refuse of 270 tons above and beyond the ordinary sugar cane refuse for the quantities of sugar cane that go through the production line. This sugar cane refuse is burned to generate electricity from steam and to heat the sugar cane. This surplus quantity of sugar cane refuse is not needed. When we dispose of it, we also dispose of a quantity of sugar with it.

Smut

The 310 variety of sugar cane, which we used originally, has actually been afflicted with smut from a fungus that came from Sudan via the Nile. However, we changed that variety, and we are now cultivating a new variety, S-9, which is resistant to smut. This variety has now become widespread over approximately 70 percent of the land. In the next 2 years we will cover the remaining area. The afflicted areas have actually been disposed of and burned, and the owners have been compensated.

Experiments are underway on three new varieties of sugar cane so that we would have a reserve for any unexpected emergencies and thus ensure the future of coming projects.

Wood and Paper Pulp

I asked Engineer 'Abd-al-Fattah, "What about this enormous yield of sugar cane refuse? Where does it go?"

[Answer] It is burned as fuel; the daily yield of this refuse has the capacity of 600 tons of heavy oil. Sugar cane refuse is thus used to generate steam, which generates electricity, to provide the necessary heat for the industry. Most of the sugar industry is based on evaporation processes. Sugar cane juice goes through a chemical process at 70 degrees centigrade. It is processed in stages until a balance is reached--the juice is neither acidic nor alkaline. Then it is cooked, also by heat, and concentrated to yield ~~no~~ other liquor. Then it is processed through machines that separate the sugar from the surrounding nectar to produce two kinds of sugar: grade A sugar, which represents 55 percent of production and is the white sugar that is suitable for consumption; and the rest, which is grade B sugar that is dark in color. This sugar is sent to plants in al-Hawamdiyah where it is refined and becomes white. What is left after that is molasses, which is used by distilleries to produce alcohol, vinegar and other derivatives.

There is another more important use for sugar cane refuse. It is turned into wood at the Kawm Umbu plant, which is one of the largest plants in the world. This plant has two production lines which yield 45,000 tons. The wood it produces is very popular. There is a plant in Idfu that produces paper pulp; it operates at a capacity of 15,000 tons, and the paper pulp it produces is sent to the Rakta Paper Company.

There is a project for using the sugar cane refuse from the Qus plant to produce paper pulp. That project, which was approved by the Japanese side during the president's recent visit to Japan, would produce 100,000 tons of paper pulp a year, and that paper pulp would be sent to the Rakta Paper Company also. This sugar cane refuse will be replaced by an alternative of heavy fuel oil [purchased] at world prices so that this would have no effect on the price of sugar cane or on the national economy.

Crystallized Sugar and Sugar Cubes

[Question] Why is it that crystallized sugar and sugar cubes sometimes disappear from the market?

[Answer] Actually, these varieties do not disappear. What happens is that production drops because these varieties are not important. We have seven plants that produce one kind of sugar: granulated sugar.

This kind of sugar is named after the machine that produced it. Sugar cubes, however, are not a variety of sugar; their production does not require technical operations. The production of sugar cubes consists of pouring the sugar into cubes. This is done at the al-Hawamdiyah plant after the grade B sugar is refined, as I said. Production of crystallized sugar has been reduced or has almost disappeared because its production is time consuming and consumers do not have much use for it, particularly since we produce less sugar than we consume.

150,000 Feddans of Sugar Cane

[Question] Why is it that some people refrain from cultivating sugar cane, and what are the solutions for that?

This was the question I asked Engineer Fathi al-Wazir, deputy minister of agriculture and president of the agricultural sector in Qina. He began by saying [the following]:

[Answer] Qina has 70 percent of the land in the country that is cultivated with sugar cane. In Qina 150,000 feddans are cultivated with sugar cane. Therefore, this land furnishes sugar cane to four existing plants. Some of those plants have problems with farmers because the plants are new. At the present time [also] the cultivation of sugar cane itself is facing problems of profitability and of labor shortage.

For example, the Naja' Hamadi plant, which is an old plant that has been operating at full capacity since 1896--1.5 million tons--has no problems. Farmers who do business with that plant do a good job of cultivating the sugar cane. The Aramant plant, which has been in existence since 1869 [sic?], is operating at above capacity. The problem has to do with the Qus plant which was built in 1968. It is operating at two thirds capacity, and we are trying to cultivate enough sugar cane for it. The Dishna plant was established in 1977, and it is operating at half capacity. We are trying [two approaches for this plant]: to increase the area that is cultivated with sugar cane or to concentrate our efforts on existing areas and increase their yield. Our principal objective now with the cultivation of sugar cane is to make it more profitable. We want to increase production and reduce costs, particularly when we know that the plant has contractual commitments with only 130,000 feddans. This means that there are 20,000 feddans that are not committed to the plant by contract, and this sugar cane is used for the production of molasses. There were about 300 cane presses 5 years ago; now there are 100 cane presses. This sugar cane is also sent to the cane presses in Cairo where the price of a glass of sugar cane juice is now 10 piasters. One feddan yields 30,000 stalks of sugar cane, and one can only imagine the profit that can be made from that. This is a problem that the Ministry of Supply has interfered in before. We think that the sugar cane which is used in producing molasses or sugar cane juice should be the sugar cane that comes from the administrative district of Dayr Mawas in the governorate of al-Minya where the area cultivated with sugar cane is more than what is required for the plant. The sugar cane that is cultivated in Qina is to be used by the plant.

Automation in Agriculture

To realize more profits, we are trying here to reduce costs and increase production. To reduce costs we are trying to automate agriculture so we can do away with the problem of shortage in technical labor and the high cost of that labor which is available. This is being done by an automation company that was established in Aswan with a loan from Japan. The Japanese also promised they would establish a company in Qina if the one in Aswan succeeds. Last year a planter was actually used. This machine can plant three feddans a day, planting the seeds deep in the soil; it saves on seeds, and it costs less. Experiments are being conducted to add blades to it so that it can plant 6 feddans [a day] and thus reduce costs [even further].

Five new Varieties

Joint studies are underway at the Ministry of Agriculture to increase production. We changed the S-310 variety, which we had been using for a long period of time, because it was afflicted with smut. We planted a new variety called S-9, which does not get affected by smut. At the present time 80 percent of the area cultivated with sugar cane in Qina is cultivated with that variety. There are five other new varieties at the research station in al-Mata'inah. Each variety is planted in an area of 200 feddans. One feddan can be used to plant eight feddans. This is because cuttings are used to plant sugar cane. In other words, the new varieties of sugar cane will be planted in 1,600 feddans in the fall. These varieties promise to yield a good crop that will not be affected by black spots.

Procurement Price

There is the problem of procurement which was solved this year by setting a uniform price for the procurement of sugar cane. This is like what is being done in the district of Abu Qarqas where the plant purchases the sugar cane by weight. This is the result of an old problem with farmers refusing [to cultivate sugar cane]. In Abu Qarqas the sugar cane was purchased by weight to encourage farmers, and the remaining farmers demanded equal treatment. This year sugar cane was purchased by weight, and [that practice] was applied in Qina and in Aswan.

The Price Changed

[Question] Will the price remain constant at this figure?

[Answer] I do not believe so. The price will change as costs change. Ten years ago the price of sugar cane was 257 piasters a ton. In other words 1 kilogram of sugar cane cost 25 milliemes. In those days workers were abundant, and wages were low. Then matters changed, and the price of sugar cane became 10 pounds per ton. The price continued to rise, and it is now 17.30 pounds per ton.

[Question] Wouldn't this affect the price of a kilogram of sugar in the future?

[Answer] That will be determined by the state and the subsidy.

[Question] What is the possibility that the sugar cane which the plants need to operate will be available?

[Answer] The possibility is great, God willing, because, as I said, reducing costs through automation will encourage farmers. Also regulating and causing the cultivated area to thrive will help, as well as the use of harvesting machinery and other new machinery that can strip the sugar cane of leaves and other materials to increase the farmers' profits. All this will ultimately lead to a situation where the sugar cane which the plants need will become available. In addition, variety will be improved, and that can increase productivity per feddan so that each feddan can yield more sugar.

MASSIVE PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT AT RA'S AL-UNUF SURVEYED ✓

Tripoli AL-MUNTIJUN in Arabic 18 Jun 83 pp 6, 7

[Article: "The Ra's al-Unuf Oil and Gas Processing Complex: The Jamahiriya Enters the Heavy Industries State"] ✓

[Text] Now that the great First of September revolution has taken great, giant steps in the area of light industries of all kinds, it has now started to enter into heavy industries, which are central in the field petrochemicals manufacture.

The Ra's al-Unuf complex of the Ra's al-Unuf Oil and Gas Processing Company is to be considered the first step in the area of the heavy industries the jamahiriya has started to enter into. This is one of the biggest projects to be carried out so far in the realm of the oil industry in the Middle East and North Africa.

In view of the enormous size of this petrochemical project and the enormous magnitude of the investment expenditures needed to carry it out, it was necessary to build it in three stages:

1. The first stage:

This consists of the refinery, the ethylene plant, the general facilities needed for the complex, and the port. This stage produces diesel fuel and the raw material needed for the ethylene plant, which in turn uses this raw material to produce intermediate petrochemicals.

2. The second stage:

This consists of the processing units attached to the refinery and the ethylene [plant] to produce automobile fuel, coal coke and finished petrochemical materials, with the goal of improving the economics of the complex.

3. The third stage:

This consists of the technical studies required to develop the second state or add new plants.

The First Stage

This includes the Ra's al-Unuf refinery, the ethylene plant, general facilities, the port of Ra's al-Unuf, marine facilities and the first phase of the residential community.

One: The Refinery

This refinery has been designed to operate on Sarir crude, with a capacity of 220,000 barrels a day; other similar crudes can be refined.

Sarir crude reaches it by a pipeline laid from the Mobil Company tanks at Ra's Lanuf to the refinery tanks. The refinery contains two atmospheric distillation units.

Products of the refinery:

1. Liquefied gas, 92,800 tons per year.
2. Untreated naphtha, 1,637,200 tons per year.
3. Kerosene, 500,000 tons a year.
4. Light diesel fuel, 1,965,000 tons per year.
5. Heavy diesel fuel, 445,000 tons per year.
6. Heavy oil (residual), 5.36 million tons per year.

These products will be loaded and exported via the port which is now being built as part of the project's marine facilities and utilities.

A number of tanks for various products and crude oil will be built in the refinery, and it will be possible to export crude oil from the special tanks via this port.

In the context of the preservation of the safety of the environment and the workers, the use of air coolers has been introduced wherever possible.

A unit has also been added to treat the water used in the operating units, and the refinery has been supplied with a preliminary treatment unit to separate the oil from the other liquids before it is pumped to the main treatment unit in the complex.

The refinery supplies the ethylene plant with the raw material needed for its operation, naphtha, and supplies the fuels needed for the units in the utilities in the complex. Liquefied petroleum gas, airplane fuel, diesel fuel and fuel oil to be refined into other products after the attached units are established are also produced.

The rate of overall completion in this plant, up to the end of April, came to 98.2 percent of the total work. The mechanical installations have been integrated

and have entered the phased delivery process, and it is expected that operating tests will start before the end of this year.

Two: The Ethylene Plant

Ethylene is considered an intermediate petrochemical by means of which it is possible to engage in the manufacture of plastics and synthetic fibers. Thus the jamahiriya, by emphasizing the ethylene plant, will have laid the cornerstone to enter into petrochemical industries, and we will thereby have entered another stage of industrialization which is more advanced than the refining industry in terms of complexity and progress.

The products of the ethylene plant are:

1. Ethylene, 330,000 tons a year.
2. Propylene, 171,000 tons a year.
3. K-4 blend, 130,000 tons per year.
4. Fuel oil, 43,500 tons per year.
5. Gasoline, 323,200 tons a year.

This project also includes a unit to treat gasoil which separates and produces the following:

- A. K-9 gasoline, 20,300 tons per year.
- B. K-6 [and] K-8, yield 220,400 tons per year.
- C. K-5 gasoline, 66,600 tons per year.

Production Stages

The naphtha produced in the adjacent refinery is considered the raw material for the ethylene plant; it is prepared and run through a chemical reaction by a thermal process called cracking, which produces a large group of organic compounds, the most important of which is ethylene.

This naphtha is cracked under high temperatures of up to 1,200 degrees centigrade in vessels designed especially for this purpose. After the cracking process, the gas produced by the cracking process is quickly cooled in order to stop the reaction, after which the heavy materials are separated from the cracked gas; the materials consist of oil and water, since fuel oil and water are produced. In addition, some of this separated water is converted to steam which is reused in the vessels to increase the percentage of the ethylene in the olefins.

At the same time, the oil and water cooling process is used to heat some materials in various thermal coolers, in which process the virgin gas contains hydrocarbons

such as ethylene, ethane, propane, propylene and a mixture of carbon-4 gas components. It also contains K-5 gasoil as well as some light materials such as hydrogen, methane and impurities, including carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulphates. After that, the four-stage pressure and cooling operations begin. In each of these stages, the heavy compounds and water are separated, preparatory to various stages of cooled and heated distillation. In the course of this, the gas is cooled to very low temperatures reaching 163 below zero centigrade. Light materials such as hydrogen and methane are separated out and carbon monoxide is eliminated in reactors which are provided expressly for this purpose.

The remaining gas is pumped into a column to separate all the carbon dioxide gas compounds, which consist of ethane, ethylene, and acetylene; this gas is run through the ethylene tower after the acetylene gas has been stripped off. In various reactors designed for this purpose, to be converted to ethylene. In the ethylene tower, the ethylene gas is separated from ethane gas and the ethylene is piped to tanks as a product and then returned to the stills so that it may be re-cracked.

After the separation of the carbon dioxide gas compounds, the gas is piped to another tower, called the separation tower for carbon dioxide gas compounds, which consist of propane, (propana), butadiene and methyl acetylene. The latter two compounds are stripped off in reactors designed for this purpose and converted to propylene. This gas is fed to the propylene tower, where the propylene gas is separated from the propane. The former is piped to tanks as a product; the latter is removed with the ethane gas, and the two are piped to columns to be cracked, to obtain a better yield of ethylene.

The remaining gas is piped to the final column, which is called the carbon-4 gas compound separation tower. A mixture of K-4 is separated as a product at the upper end of the tower. The remainder except for the [product in the] lower end of this tower is piped to another unit called the gasoline treatment unit, where hydrocarbons are hydrogenated and stabilized in order to raise and upgrade their specifications.

It should not be a secret to anyone that this plant is still in the construction process, and the rate of construction as of the middle of May 1983 came to 97.1 percent of final construction. It is expected that construction will be fully completed toward the end of September 1983.

Three: Utilities

In view of the complex's need for the various utilities which must be provided to operate it, in the form of electricity, steam, cooling, nitrogen, air and the like, a massive plant is being constructed for these utilities, which will be compatible, in terms of capabilities, with the requirements of the volume of manufacture provided in this tremendous project. In its design, attention has been given to the need to enable it to accommodate the plants in the first and second stage, not to speak of any other plants which it might be considered appropriate to use in the future, when maximum confidence has been achieved that the operation will be able to keep operating.

Seawater

Herewith we will present an idea of the components of the utilities and the operations which are carried out in them:

Seawater flows through two 3.7-meter pipes, 1,000 meters long each, to the seawater intake area, where it is stripped of marine plants and other impurities, then treated with chlorine to prevent the growth of plants and algae in the pipes and heat exchangers. The seawater is pumped from this basin (the inlet) to the utility plant by eight massive pumps with a capacity of 22,400 kilograms per hour. It is worth pointing out that this basin is to be considered one of the biggest inlets in the jamahiriya; the size of this basin is 140 by 37 meters. In addition, this basin was built outside the site set aside for it and was floated into place in its present location.

In the utility plant, part of the seawater is used to cool the water that is used for cooling in the plants. One should bear in mind that the water for cooling the plants is run through a closed cycle in order to retain the fresh water that is obtained from the desalination plants.

The rest of the seawater is desalinated in four desalination plants with a capacity of 250 cubic meters per hour each. These plants are considered to be the main source of the cooling water referred to above and the water for drinking and other services in the residential community and the complex.

Electricity Generation

Part of the water that is desalinated in these plants is treated to remove salts and oxygen so that it may be used in the steam production stages which come to nine, with a capacity of 170 tons per hour of 496-degree centigrade steam each at a pressure of 105 kilograms per square centimeter.

The bulk of this steam is used to operate steam turbines with the objective of generating the electric power needed for the complex and the residential community. This comes to a total of 170 megawatts.

We would like to point out that there are two kinds of steam generator-concentrated steam turbines, which generate electric power only, and unconcentrated steam turbines, which produce electric power as well as steam at low pressure and temperature for use in the various plants in the complex and the buildings.

In addition to these steam turbines, there are two gas turbines in the complex with a capacity of 20 megawatts each. These are now used in the building stage and supply the residential community with the necessary electric power. When the steam turbines are in operation, they will be used in emergencies.

The utility plant also contains two units to produce nitrogen and air for various uses in the plant.

In view of the importance of a constant supply of electric power and other services, consideration has been given to design the utility system on a basis of

continuous operation; in the event any breakdowns occur in any of these utilities, similar alternatives (reserves) will be put to use automatically, and no shut-downs in the course of work and production in the complex will occur.

As regards the status of utility construction, up to the end of May it came to [words missing]; it is expected that the mechanical installations will be completed by the end of September, directly when the delivery process starts, to be followed by operating tests to prepare the plant for actual operation.

In addition, the steam necessary for operation startup will be produced from operating boilers this September.

Four: Auxiliary Utilities

In addition to the utility units mentioned above, requirements dictate that the essential service utilities supplementary to the basic units of the complex be built. Among these utilities are the following:

First, workshops:

Workshops are considered among the complex's basic service utilities; they are furnished with the most modern machinery and equipment, through which it is possible to conduct all maintenance activities on heavy and precision equipment and all electric and electronic equipment in the complex. The complex contains the following workshops:

1. The heavy equipment workshop.
2. The light equipment workshop.
3. The vehicle workshop.
4. A workshop for automobiles.
5. A civil maintenance workshop.

The plant, in the workshop area, has been supplied with a building for producers in which the necessary light equipment will be kept. It has been supplied with lockers for retaining this machinery, changing rooms, a shower and other necessary services for the producers in the workshops.

Second, warehouses:

The complex has three warehouses for storing all the materials needed by the complex, in the form of spare parts, chemicals, and oil, guaranteeing that the necessary spare parts and materials for the constant uninterrupted operation of the plants will be available. In the design of these plants, all necessary considerations have been taken into account to provide a maximum of security and to avoid fire dangers by installing a modern firefighting system. This system is composed of equipment for discovering flammable gases so that the necessary precautions may be taken to prevent gases from accumulating to the danger point. There also are other instruments which make it possible to operate the firefighting system at the mere occurrence of the first spark, which will guarantee that it is extinguished at the right time.

In addition to that, the warehouses have been equipped with simple local fire-hoses that are present in all the necessary warehouses and offices for the management and producers working in the warehouses.

The total area of the warehouses comes to about 21,845 square meters, distributed among the three warehouses as follows:

1. The main warehouse, 12,740 square meters.
2. The chemicals warehouse, 7,125 square meters.
3. The oil warehouse, 1,980 square meters.

All work has been completed in these warehouses, and two of them were delivered by the contractor by 1 May. The transfer of materials to them from the company's temporary warehouses will start soon.

Third, fire stations:

The complex has been provided with a central fire station to help extinguish fires that could break out anywhere in the complex. The station building has been equipped with the most modern fire trucks and an observation room that makes it possible to determine the location of the fire at once on the observation screen as soon as it breaks out. Oil fires are particularly to be fought in view of the presence of chemicals; the complex has therefore been outfitted with warehouses with the necessary foamy materials to extinguish oil fires.

In this station, domestic personnel will be trained in the theory and practice of the use of equipment and firefighting activity.

This building contains an adequate number of offices for people working in the station, in addition to a lecture hall and the warehouses needed for various items of equipment and materials.

The inside of the complex has been equipped with sprinklers distributed among the various areas of the complex and water pipes installed on the tanks to help cool them during the outbreak of all fires, and it is possible to load fire trucks from these locations to back up the suppression of non-oil fires.

Fourth, the health center:

In view of the risks that are common to work in petrochemical complexes in general, and in view of the immensity of the project, there is a critical need to supply the complex with a health center which will be compatible in its functions with the requirements of industrial medicine, and thus its function differs from those of traditional hospitals.

In this center, basic medical examinations and analyses will be conducted on people who want to come to work in the complex to ascertain that their physical health is fit for the nature of the work, along with periodic medical examina-

tions and analyses on employees in the complex to ascertain the extent to which the circumstances surrounding them have influenced their physical condition, so that it will be possible to adopt the suitable decisions to assign people working in their current positions or transfer them to other more suitable locations.

Work injuries will also be treated in this center, and urgent operations where it is not feasible to transfer the injured person to a general hospital will be carried out.

To this end, the center will be outfitted with the most modern medical equipment needed for operations and essential medical analyses. Work on this building has been completed and all essential medical equipment has been supplied and will be installed as soon as the building is received from the contractor. A committee has been formed to take delivery for this purpose, and it is expected that it will finish its work at the end of this month.

Fifth, the cafeteria building:

This building was constructed with the objective of providing essential services for employees, to provide meals and also to prepare meals required by shifts at other times. This building can accommodate about 600 persons at a time. In the design of this building, attention has also been given to providing optimum sanitary conditions, comfort and safety. In addition to the main dining room, this building contains a rest area, baths, bathrooms, storage areas, and refrigerators for keeping vegetables and meat. The food preparation room has been equipped with the necessary equipment, ventilating equipment, backup power sources and firefighting equipment.

Attention has been given to keeping the dining room separate from the food preparation room, and thus all the equipment and the kitchen have been placed on the ground floor of the building, and the second floor has been set aside for the dining room and rest area.

Sixth, the laboratory building:

This building contains all the laboratories needed to conduct tests on the products produced with the objective of quality control and to confirm that the products conform to international standard specifications. Work has been completed in this building, and it will be delivered by the contractor at the end of this month.

The laboratory has been supplied with the most up to date necessary laboratory equipment. This has been imported and will be installed as soon as the building is delivered at the end of this month.

Seventh, branch distribution stations:

The auxiliary facility area has been equipped with six branch distribution stations of 6 kilometers [sic] to distribute power. These stations are supplied by the main power station of the complex.

Eighth, the drainage water treatment plant:

The auxiliary facility area has been supplied with a plant to treat sewer water and water mixed with oil so that the oil may be extracted and pumped back into a special tank.

Ninth, the general administration building:

A. The administration building.

In view of the large size of the complex and the massive number of people needed to administer it when its three stages are completed, it will become necessary to provide essential administrative services to run the work. To this end, the general administration has been built. This comprises three floors:

The basement, the ground floor and the second floor.

All necessary services for the building, such as the garage, central heating and cooling equipment, electrical and water extensions, and drainpipes, are concentrated in the basement.

The basement also contains the bank, the post office, such facilities as air conditioning equipment and so forth, a telephone department, a printing unit, first aid, an industrial safety unit, a stationery shop, and a copying and photographing room.

On the ground floor there are a computer unit, annexes to that, various engineering departments and the technical library.

On the second floor there are the company administrative offices and the other departments subordinate to that, such as finance, marketing, personnel affairs and so forth.

B. The cafeteria building.

This building consists of two stories, the basement and the ground floor. The basement consists of kitchens, equipment, food storage areas and central cooling and air conditioning equipment. The main floor contains a dining room and the facilities required for that. The dining room can accommodate 264 persons.

C. The industrial security building.

This contains the offices of the people working in the industrial security department. Another building belongs to this department, known as the emergency room inside the complex and is to be used by the industrial safety section of the loss prevention department. It is equipped with modern precision equipment for observing everything going on inside the complex and outside the areas surrounding it in order to guarantee the safety of the workers and the equipment inside the complex.

It is worth pointing out that the rate of completion, by the end of April 1983, was 98 percent in the administration building and subordinate areas, and it is expected that the work will be completed at the end of September 1983.

The Project To Load Liquids via Ra's al-Unuf Terminal

The liquid loading project is important and vital; its importance lies in the fact that it is the only means for exporting products from the refinery and the ethylene plant, through pipes of various sizes, stabilized pumps, and loading arms whose bore is made of super steel. Were these pumps and items of equipment not available, it would not be possible to export and load the products. This project consists of two loading systems:

1. The manual loading system, which is expected to be completed at the end of this year. This system exists to be used, starting then, to load products while the automatic system is being installed. One should note that the manual system complements the automatic one.
2. The automatic loading system, which is expected to be completed at the end of 1985. Through the modern technology that makes up this system, all loading operations on the docks, surveillance of these, and determination of their volumes will be done from the special command and control room automatically, in accordance with the most modern loading techniques used in the world.

Pier Three.

This pier consists of two mooring points, A and B. It will be devoted to the loading of gas products in liquid form, in the case of same gases such as ethylene, after the gas has been run through modern cooling equipment to lower the temperature of the gas exported in liquid form.

Eight loading arms are being installed on these mooring points. The liquid gas will be exported through them, by loading chemical tankers manufactured for this purpose whose maximum capacity comes to 4,000 deadweight metric tons. It is possible to accommodate vessels 30,000 metric tons in size.

It is expected that the quantities of gas products exported from this pier will come to about 500,000 metric tons per year, which will be pumped to tankers by pumps. In the first stage, 106 tankers will anchor at this pier.

This pier has been outfitted with the most up-to-date safety and firefighting equipment. There is a special control room for that from which the operations of investigating for gas leaks and fire warnings are run, as well as the requisite measures for extinguishing fires. All the machinery and equipment can be operated automatically from this control room.

Pier Two

This pier consists of two mooring locations known as points A and B. This has been set aside for the loading of white (light) products such as naphtha, household kerosene, gasoline for heating and jet fuel. Ten 30-centimeter loading arms have been installed on this pier through which 1.6 million metric tons

of these products will be exported by means of pumps whose flow rates total 3,700 cubic meters per hour, to load tankers to 30,000 metric tons' capacity. In the first phase, it is expected that 138 tankers will moor at this pier. In the second stage, the number will rise to 230; for this stage, plans have been made to load 4.7 million metric tons of white (light) products.

Pier Two is connected by the loading equipment to the ballast water treatment unit, which exists to protect the environment in accordance with the requirements of the IMCO organization of which we are a member. In the event any oil or products seepage from the loading pipes occurs, this oil will be collected in a special tank to be pumped to the treatment unit, to separate the water from the oil. The oil will then be pumped to the refinery unit to be rerefined.

This pier has been equipped with the most modern equipment for safety requirements and firefighting equipment, since there is a special branch surveillance room through which it is possible to ascertain the discovery of any leakage of gases and warn of fire as well as to take requisite firefighting measures. All equipment and machinery can be operated automatically from the command and control room.

3. [Sic] Pier One.

This pier consists of two mooring points known as mooring points A and B. It is devoted to the export of heavy or "black" products such as heavy oil and gasoil. Installed on this pier are 12 loading arms 30 centimeters in diameter each through which 3.2 million metric tons of heavy oil and about 1.2 million metric tons of gasoil are exported by bumps whose flow rate totals 3,700 cubic meters per hour, loading tankers of a maximum capacity of 50,000 deadweight metric tons. It is expected that 66 tankers will moor at this pier during the first phase of operation.

This pier is connected by loading pipes to a ballast water treatment unit on which special tanks have been erected to collect oil which has leaked out. That oil will be pumped to the treatment unit so that the water may be separated from it and it may be used after it is rerefined.

This pier is equipped with the most up to date safety equipment and firefighting apparatuses; there is a special control room on the pier from within which will be possible to learn of the outbreak of any fires and consequently adopt firefighting measures and operate the necessary equipment for that automatically.

Three hundred ten product tankers will be loaded annually in the first stage of operation of this project. This figure will increase to 450 in the second stage, God willing.

The Second Stage

This stage includes new plants which will be added to the units that exist in the complex at the present time, with the goal of increasing the economic value of products from both the refinery and the ethylene [plant], in addition to producing finished petrochemicals.

The companies possessing patents for the technology in these units have been selected, and contacts and negotiations are now underway to choose a suitable engineering contractor.

The second stage projects are broken down into two areas:

- A. Projects for units annexed to the refinery.
- B. Projects for units annexed to the ethylene plant.
- A. Projects for units annexed to the refinery:

- 1. The naphtha upgrading and gasoline production unit.

The productive capacity of this unit will be 1.39 million tons per year, producing 178,000 tons of light naphtha per year, 960,000 tons of gasoline a year and 53,000 tons of hydrogen gas a year.

- 2. The vacuum distillation unit.

The productive capacity of this will be 3.59 million tons a year, producing 1.69 million tons of diesel fuel and 1,553,000 tons of heavy oil a year.

- 3. Petroleum coke production, drying and treatment units.

Its annual productive capacity will be 692,000 tons of heavy oil, 10,600 of liquefied gas, 185,800 tons of diesel coke, 96,700 tons of diesel oil and 200,000 tons of coke dried in the drying unit of a grade for use in anodes. About 164,250 tons of dried coke will be produced per year.

- 4. The unit to produce liquid petroleum gas.

This will receive products in gas form from various units in the refinery. It is projected that it will produce 309,000 tons of gas per year at the end of the third stage of the project.

- B. Projects for units annexed to the ethylene plant:

- 1. The high-density polyethylene plant, whose productive capacity will be 80,000 tons per year.
- 2. The low-density polyethylene plant, with a productive capacity of 80,000 tons per year.
- 3. The butadiene plant, with a productive capacity of 58,000 tons per year.
- 4. The polypropylene plant, with a productive capacity of 68,000 tons per year.
- 5. The low-density polyethylene plant, with a productive capacity of 50,000 tons per year.

6. The ethylene glycol plant, whose productive capacity will be 52,000 tons per year.

7. The gasoline upgrading plant, with a productive capacity of 46,000 tons per year.

8. The plant to produce aromatic gasoline, with a productive capacity of 151,000 tons per year.

All these plants will receive their raw materials from the intermediary products of the ethylene plant.

The Third State

Proceeding from the strategy of processing all the intermediate petroleum products that can be processed in the complex itself, above and beyond the continued improvement of these products, preliminary economic studies are being made of units that can be added to second stage plants in order to increase the productive capacity of these plants. The establishment of new plants will bring about the optimum exploitation of all the subsequent intermediate materials that will be produced.

11887

CSO: 4504/445

ALI YATA INTERVIEWED ON PPS THIRD CONGRESS, PARTY STRATEGY

Casablanca LAMALIF in French No 147, Jun-Jul 83 pp 10-11

[Interview with Ali Yata, secretary general of the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS); date and place not specified]

/Text/ In the aftermath of the Third Congress of the PPS (on which we reported in our issue no 145), the party's secretary general, Ali Yata, explains the party's positions in the interview that follows.

Mr Yata speaks of the unity that marked the congress, and emphasizes the development of the PPS, which is now "better established" and seeks to be open, without being dogmatic. He also affirms the party's positive attitude; it does not want to "oppose for the sake of opposing."

The developments during the 10 June elections prompted the PPS to take a strong position against "doctoring," which it condemned in vigorous terms. It is known that the PPS has demanded cancellation of the 10 June results and the provision of guarantees of the honesty of future elections.

This interview, though given before the election, is no less revealing, because Mr Yata defines his party's basic positions for the current phase, and affirms his goals of broadening and internal reorganization of the party--subjects about which he also drew some conclusions from the 10 June voting results.

After the Third National Congress, PPS Secretary General Ali Yata sums up the results in the following interview:

Aziz Lahlou: What is your assessment of the work of your Third Congress? Could we use the terms "change within continuity?"

Ali Yata: Certainly, one can make an extremely positive assessment of the work of our party's Third Congress. Our congress, the supreme body of the PPS, was attended by almost 1,200 delegates from all parts of the country. During the proceedings, which lasted 3 days, the delegates, workers, small farmers,

artisans, intellectuals and students democratically discussed the draft proposals prepared by the outgoing Central Committee and its activity report. They unanimously approved these two very important documents, voted unanimously for updating the party's program, and unanimously elected the party's leadership bodies.

This unanimity, which was in no way artificial, reflects the solid political and ideological unity that binds the PPS ranks from top to bottom, a unity that was witnessed by some 30 delegations of fraternal parties and foreign friends who, along with the Political Bureau of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), witnessed our proceedings. Hence, one can say that the PPS, while continuing the struggle as a revolutionary party of the laboring class and the working people, has evolved...without having changed. It has evolved, because today it is stronger, even better established in the heart of the country, and ever more a presence among the masses. It remains the same in the sense that it still adheres to the mission for which it was created almost 40 years ago: to defend the higher interests of the country and the working people, and to promote the noble ideals of scientific socialism.

Aziz Lahlou: Don't you think that the diversity of opinion in your party is a necessary condition for its evolution?

Ali Yata: The PPS is not a party that is dogmatic and closed to internal discussion. However, nor is it a heterogenous structure, a Spanish inn." Discussion within the party is carried out in a responsible and democratic way, but it never prevents action, it is not paralyzing, as is the case in some other parties. Our political and ideological unity is the fruit of internal discussion, which takes place in respect for the principles of democratic centralism; when the majority has taken a decision, the minority must implement the policy. It may wish to reopen the debate, but without blocking implementation of the decisions that have been democratically reached. That is how we "operate. This system has enabled us to stay on the scene, whatever the difficulties. for 40 years. Thus, we do not at all wish to "evolve" through a so-called "diversity of opinion," as your question implied: we have no urge to become a social-democratic conglomerate in which the factions tear each other apart, nor to transform ourselves into a sterile club, where the purpose of discussion is the esthetics of language. We are a political party in which people have hopes; we need to act, not split hairs. We do act, and our daily presence on the political scene proves it.

Aziz Lahlou: What do you think about the "current" efforts by some circles to sideline the Moroccan Left through "creation" of new parties?

Ali Yata: These efforts are doomed to failures...if their real objective is to "compete" with the Left on its own ground. Certainly, we have no objection in principle to the establishment of new parties. We struggled enough to establish our own right to legal existence and open activity to prevent us from ever assuming a negative attitude toward anyone who seeks to exercise his democratic right to organize politically and practice freedom of association. The fact remains that the Left is sufficiently solid and organized--and I am thinking particularly of the PPS and its undeniable internal unity--so that it does not

need to fear the presence of these parties of the moment, which do not have any real audience among the masses or any future on the political scene. Past experience is eloquent in this regard: Today, what has become of the "self-proclaimed" "Socialist Democratic Party," established at the beginning of the 1960's by certain people who today are behind the sterile partisan agitation, claiming to be innovational, but in fact despicably political?

Aziz Lahlou: Are there definite prospects for a Union of Leftist Forces for the coming elections?

Ali Yata: I want to make clear, first of all, that the union of progressives and democrats, the coalition of the Leftist forces, is not an electoral or current concern for us. We in the PPS regard this union as a strategic necessity in our current historical phase, that of the national democratic revolution. Meanwhile, the very numerous points of agreement that bring us closer to the other forces of the Left, particularly our USFP brothers, are sufficiently important to go beyond the threshold of the coming elections.

Having said that, it must be admitted that during the last few months there have been increasing contacts and exchanges of views with our USFP brothers. The leaders of the two parties have had several meetings, culminated by joint communiques that are known to have received wide public attention. It should also be noted that the entire USFP Political Bureau, headed by brother Abderrahim Bouabid, came to pay their greetings to our recent Third National Congress. All that is certainly significant and encouraging. On our party, though we don't hesitate to enter the elections alone, we are convinced that a united Left could demonstrate in the elections that it is strong and is the focus of the hopes of a majority. The PPS, as its congress reaffirmed, is ready to demonstrate this through a joint united program--a program which our points of agreement with the USFP would make it easy to develop.

Aziz Lahlou: Do you desire to remain eternally an "opposition party?"

Ali Yata: Opposing for the sake of opposing does not interest us. Nor are we in a kind of purgatory that will subsequently enable us to see better days. We are a patriotic, progressive and democratic party that is on the side of the popular masses and whose only concern is to defend and promote the higher interests of the country and the aspirations of the Moroccan people. We have principals, a program and hopes: We currently oppose the antipopular economic and social policy that makes the masses pay the price for the structural crisis and keeps the country in the state of underdevelopment and dependence. If, through the union, the opportunity arose to undertake a democratic change and a progressive alternative, we would not hesitate to assume our responsibilities.... Just as today we assume our responsibilities by stating our critical opinion on what is not working and by making concrete proposals that could be rapidly implemented to change the course of developments.

9920

CSO: 4519/294

INTEGRATION PROJECTS DISCUSSED

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 28 May 83 p 9

[Article by Engineer 'Umar Ahmad Mar'i: "Integration and Agricultural Development"]

[Text] Egypt and Sudan constitute the heart of the Arab nation. They make up close to half the area and the population of that nation. The resources they have make them the cornerstone of any action that might be taken to overcome [the effects of] the world-wide food shortage on their countries and on the countries of the region. It is estimated that the area of the Nile Valley--Egypt and Sudan--is approximately 3.5 million square kilometers. Sudan has approximately 2.5 million square kilometers; approximately 180 million feddans of that land is arable. At the present time approximately 5.9 million feddans are cultivated in Egypt and approximately 18.7 million feddans are cultivated in Sudan.

It is doubtless, therefore, that most of the horizontal expansion is located in Sudan. The area of land that may be reclaimed in Sudan is close to 180 million feddans. Of this area about 6.4 million feddans may be cultivated by irrigating the land; at the present time 3.6 million feddans of that area are being put to profitable use. The remaining areas, about 174.6 million feddans, are located in rain-irrigated terrain. Accordingly, we think that a detailed study of rain-irrigated land in Sudan is imperative if we want a fast agricultural development that will utilize rain-irrigated land and rely on [the implementation of] full automation in Egypt. Areas up to 900,000 feddans on both sides of the Delta and in different regions have been reclaimed. Approximately 200,000 feddans of this land have reached the level of ordinary productivity. If we were to enumerate animal resources in Sudan following the efforts that have been made to develop them, we would find that they would be enough to meet 40 percent of the demand for meat in the Arab region. This is a significant factor that is considered essential to national security questions.

One of the most important fundamental factors in Sudan is the care that is to be taken in building and paving roads so as to hold down the costs of transporting crops and animals so that prices of these articles would not rise and become non-competitive with world prices. At the present time Sudan relies on the railroads. The railroad system in Sudan covers about 4,800 kilometers, and it carries about 2.5 million tons of goods. About 300,000 tons are transported [from one place to another] by land; the southern province transports 200,000 tons on

the river; and 200,000 tons [of goods] are also transported on the river. Sudan's plan must also include expanding the construction of paved roads linking together the agricultural areas that produce cotton, peanuts, sesame and high-grade corn. Agricultural production from rain-irrigated land amounts generally to about 85 percent of all agricultural production; 15 percent of agricultural production comes from land that is irrigated [by other means].

Therefore, the cultivation of wheat in irrigated areas must be expanded as much as possible. Areas that are cultivated with high-grade corn are to be reduced, and water for irrigation is to be used for cultivating export crops such as cotton and peanuts. The cultivation of feed crops and the production of feed must also be introduced, particularly in densely populated areas and in areas where cattle are raised.

The state is joining farmers in the production of cotton. A farmer's share is now up to 50 percent, and incentives have been introduced; this increases the farmer's share [of the profits]. Therefore, a law encouraging investments in agriculture has been issued recently.

As far as irrigated land is concerned, we find that crop rotations were basically designed for the production of cotton as the primary export crop. The situation was changed early in the sixties with the expansion and diversification of export crops as a way out of the constraints [that result from having] one export crop. Grains are cultivated in over half the crop producing area. The high-grade corn crop is considered one of the most important grain crops [in Sudan], representing about 64 percent of the total area in the country that is cultivated with grain.

In order to begin designing the common and proposed programs and projects that would bring about integration, we must realize that there is a shortage in Egypt and in Sudan of some agricultural commodities such as wheat, oil producing plants and sugar. This requires that common efforts be made to increase production and shore up trade in order to benefit from the surplus goods that are available in each country and establish joint projects for meat production; for food security; and for the production of feed, oil-producing plants, sugar, tea, coffee and tobacco.

There is no doubt that the preparation of accurate and sound economic feasibility studies would encourage the establishment of investment projects. It would particularly encourage the investment of Arab and foreign funds.

Added to that would be Egyptian manpower and expertise along with expansion in the use of automation, particularly in the vast areas that are irrigated by rain.

There is no doubt that the profitable use of these vast, fertile and arable lands in Egypt and in Sudan, which have a unique central location to Arab, African and Asian countries, would safeguard the food security of these countries and would protect their future in a world that is faced with food shortages. The profitable use of this centrally located land would provide those countries with their security, their stability and their freedom.

One of the important projects that may be added to meat, poultry and feed [production] projects is a joint project to produce sugar. This may be done by

increasing the areas in Sudan that are cultivated with sugar cane in the areas of Kinanah in the White Nile; Mongalla; New Halfa; and Sannar. This would close the economic gap and end the sugar shortage. Demand in both countries for tea can be met by expanding the cultivation of tea. The same is true regarding coffee whose cultivation may be expanded in the south. Production of palm oil, which may also be expanded in the south, was quite successful in Nigeria and in Malaysia. This not only reduced citizens' standards of living, [sic?] but it also increased the costs of development projects, particularly with the rise in the value of borrowed currencies. Increasing production costs could also cut down on the ability of processed goods to compete. Therefore, monetary measures and policies as well as education must be used to reduce public and private consumption, to draw up a short-term and a long-term plan and to benefit from studying previous and subsequent relations in all joint projects with Egypt and Sudan: those that succeeded; those that floundered; and those that failed. The pros and cons of these projects as well as their drawbacks and strong points are to be defined. If we want to effect internal reforms, we will have to reduce government and individual consumption, and we will have to adopt fiscal and monetary policies that would encourage savings. We will have to try to benefit from scientific progress and from automation, and we will have to make an effort to increase production.

In the foreign area we have to get the maximum we can from the IBRD group and from the competent UN agencies. We have to try to encourage oil producing countries to increase their financial contributions to the fund. We have to earmark no less than 70 percent of capital to agricultural and road projects. In addition, we have to encourage financing organizations to offer technical assistance in the preparation of technical and economic feasibility studies for projects. We have to comply with investment laws, and we have to consider coordinating those laws in the light of unity to provide confidence and réassurance [to investors] and prevent tampering and exploitation. We must also try to increase the contributions made by financing organizations in the north and in the south, or rather in the same country, and we must try to intensify their activities in agriculture.

8592

CSO: 4504/449

MAGNITUDE, STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES OF OPPOSITION EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 11 May 83 p 2

[Article by 'Ayidah al-'Azab Musa: "Numayri and the Consensus in Sudan"]

[Text] President Ja'far Numayri was re-elected president of the Republic of Sudan for the third time with 99.6 percent of the vote. Polls in Sudan had stayed open more than 15 days so that the Sudanese people could vote.

We sincerely hope that this outcome is one that expresses the wishes of the Sudanese public. Consensus in Sudan over President Numayri is a matter that concerns not only the fraternal country of Sudan; this is a matter that has the same impact and attracts the same interest among the Egyptian people. That is due to the common history and the same destiny that bind the two peoples. But even though nature did favor the Sudanese and Egyptian peoples with this unique feature, today, in the age of powerful blocs and groupings, the Egyptian people and the Sudanese people have a great need for more rapprochement and integration. Herein lies the source of our interest in the outcome of Sudan's presidential elections.

The outcome of the elections provides reassurance that President Numayri, who by his own admission was the target of more attempts to overthrow him than any other African leader, is still the leader [of the country. Election results confirm] that the Sudanese people still rally around him. The outcome of the elections provides reassurance that the four tenths of one percent who said no to the re-election of Numayri are only those who oppose him. They are the embittered and those who would overthrow the government. They are the ones who lead demonstrations from the Tri-City Capital to the farthest points in the south.

With all due respect to the outcome of the elections, it is an undeniable fact that ever since 1980 the mainstream of political thought in Sudan has been moving against prevailing political and economic conditions in Sudan. This is manifested in sporadic demonstrations and strikes: among students [opposition] is visible; among workers it assumes the form of neglect. There is an undeclared strike among people, and this is the worst kind of strike any regime could have. This undeclared strike is accompanied by an alarming decline in productivity; by the flight of trained people from the country; and by the flight of untrained people to the oil countries. Farmers and shepherds are migrating in large numbers to cities, and this compels the regime to use the armed forces to return them to their

regions by force. These actions are known as al-kashshah campaigns. Al-kashshah is a process by which citizens whose identity cards are not issued from Khartoum are arrested, rounded up, held inhumanely in pens surrounded by barbed wire and then transported back to rural areas.

Besides, the economic condition in Sudan is deteriorating: the rise in food prices is such that ordinary citizens can no longer afford to pay those prices; and principal crops are declining. Advice that was extended by the IBRD failed to alleviate these poor conditions. That advice did in fact lead to the outbreak of demonstrations in the streets with people shouting slogans against both the IBRD and the regime.

The mistake that President Numayri made in the plans he made is that he attempted to embark on a large-scale development effort without making certain that the development was achievable. This led to more indebtedness and to the collapse of the economy. The domestic uprisings that appeared in the past 3 years--and most of these were attributed to al-Qadhdhafi--were uprisings resembling the disturbances in al-Ubayyid in November 1980 where the market was burned down and scores of people were killed while protesting rising food prices. The domestic uprisings of the past 3 years were also like the students' strikes, which were suppressed violently in the spring of 1981, and like the disturbances in the Arab province of Darfur which occurred to protest the appointment of an outsider governor of the province. These events, which appear unrelated, point to the growing political and economic crisis of the Sudanese regime, a crisis that has been growing very rapidly in the past 10 years.

Numayri's Presidency

President Numayri came to power in May 1969 by means of a military coup against a civilian, corrupt and pro-West regime. At first Numayri turned toward the Soviet Union, but then he had a difference with the Communist Party in Sudan. He was severe in wiping out that party following an attempt to overthrow him in 1971.

In the following year, in 1972, President Numayri formed the Socialist Union. He started it with some figures [who were members] of previous parties, all of which had been disbanded. But although the Socialist Union was the only party on the scene, it continued to be an organization that failed to attract the masses. The leaders of the Socialist Union were not able to fill the political vacuum in Sudan, nor were they able to replace the previous parties. As time went by, the Socialist Union ceased to have influence on the daily life of the Sudanese people. In fact, it became burdensome to the people of Sudan. Membership fees were collected by force; they were deducted from the monthly salaries of government and organization employees. Membership fees had to be paid, and employees were not asked what they thought about that, nor were they asked for their approval.

Following the attempted coup in 1971 and after president Numayri dealt a heavy blow to leftist tendencies [in Sudan], the only support he could find was in the friendship and confidence he was forging with the Muslim Brothers Group, a force with deep roots in Sudan. He appointed some members of the group to significant positions in the state, and he used them to run his executive and legislative political agencies. However, despite his alliance with the Muslim Brothers,

Numayri tried to strengthen another Islamic tendency: the Islamic Republican Party. This is a group that emerged on the scene in 1951 and is led by Mahmud Muhammad Taha. There are many reservations about that group regarding the soundness of their Islamic faith and their suspect relations with some foreign circles. This group is active among young people and university students. It is used by the regime to undermine the Muslim Brothers whose political and economic influence in the country is strong.

The Sudanese Opposition

Besides the Islamic tendency Sudan is still awash with conflicting and feuding political tendencies and activities. When the May Revolution disbanded political parties in Sudan, that measure was merely an announcement that political activities had gone underground. Underground political activity was helped by the vastness of Sudan and the weak authority of the state [everywhere] except in Khartoum. Former parties and political gatherings can still be found; they are still active and operating underground.

Secret political activity in Sudan is divided between two large blocs: one comprises former political parties, and the other is a bloc of leftist parties. The bloc of leftist parties includes those parties that have been in existence as well as new additions to them.

As far as the first bloc is concerned, there is the National Union Party, which comprises the old National Union Party and the People's Party, which is the party of al-Hatimiyah sect which is led by 'Uthman al-Mirghani. It was basically represented by al-Sharif al-Hindi in London. But after al-Hindi's death the party broke up into groups because its makeup lacked controls and because it was based on economic interests. Some of the members of that party are in government.

Al-Ummah Party, which is the party of al-Ansar sect, [is also in this bloc]. It is divided into two basic groups. The first group supports Numayri's power and is led by Ahmad al-Mahdi who was declared the imam of al-Ansar last year, in 1982, with the support of the government. The second group, which is led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, is a group of people who oppose the regime and who have relations with Saudi Arabia, with the United States and also with the Muslim Brothers. However, this group does have reservations about the Muslim Brothers' relations with the regime.

A large segment of the Muslim Brothers Group is opposed to Numayri's regime and policies. Those Muslim Brothers criticize leaders of the group who cooperate with Numayri and are considered to be among the current opposition forces.

As far as the second bloc is concerned, which is leftist, almost all the groups that make up this bloc are against the regime. They are represented by the Communist Party of Sudan--the largest and the most powerful of leftist parties [in Sudan] from the standpoint of organization and staff.

The Party of Workers and Farmers is a small party that was formed in 1968 after some of its members split with the Communist Party. This is a flexible party, well-known for the alliances it forged. It maintains good relations with the Communist Party and with the remaining leftist parties.

The Muslim Socialist Group is [a party] that was formed by the late attorney, Babakr Karar. It is a small party with Nasirist tendencies. It had relations with al-Qadhdhafi, but it broke those relations after a disagreement with him in 1978.

Dr Tahir's group, which is led by Dr Tahir 'Abd-al-Basit, is what is left of the Mu'awiyah faction that split with the Communist Party in 1970 to form a faction called the Mu'awiyah faction.

The Che Guevara Group is a very small group that has been involved in sabotage activities since early 1969.

The Pro-China Group is divided into five groups, and that division is based on the people who split with the Communist Party early in 1961. These five groups are led by Yusuf 'Abd-al-Majid, Ahmad Jabril, Mahmud Muhammad Khayri and Ahmad Shami. These groups have no following among the masses, and these five people are the only ones left in them.

There is a Nasirist Group. The strongest in this group is the Nasirist Youth Group whose basic strength lies in the universities, and particularly in the Khartoum Branch of Cairo University. This group has been in control of students' associations since 1979 and has had the tacit support of the Communist Party and the Party of Workers and Farmers.

There are [other] small Nasirist groups such as the group of 'Aishah Hasan, who was a National Guard leader early in May.

All the leftist groups have a rejectionist stance toward the regime. They refuse to join the Socialist Union, the Association of Sudanese Women or the Association of Sudanese Youth--both organizations grew out of the Socialist Union. The left controls the theater, the movies and some cultural organizations such as the Association of Writers, the Association of Sculptors and some cultural clubs.

The Crisis of the Opposition

This question may be raised: if the opposition in Sudan is so extensive and so broad, what is keeping it from coming to power? The answer to that question is simply this: the strength of the opposition is derived from the strength of the problems that exist in Sudan. The opposition itself is not powerful. The left's relations with the masses are still weak, and the left is kept out of democratic activities that take place in unions, associations and cooperative societies. In fact, except for the Party of Workers and Farmers leftist parties are not allowed to join popular government councils. To a limited degree the Communist Party is active among labor unions only.

The problem of the left lies in the fact that there are some querulous political figures who are rejecting cooperation and agreement among the organizations. They accept only the weak cooperation that occasionally takes place between the Party of Workers and Farmers, the Muslim Socialist Party and the Nasirist Youth Party.

The question of a broad front [combining] all leftist tendencies is always being raised, but that matter remains confined to discussions, and no actual action has been taken toward its implementation.

If opposition to Numayri derives its strength from the problems of the regime, President Numayri himself derives his own strength from the weakness of the opposition and from the fragmentation that exists among its factions. Besides, President Numayri derives his strength from the general fear that exists in the country, from the pressures of daily life, from the fact that most of the opposition is preoccupied with the daily problems of life and, above all, from Saudi and Egyptian support for him.

However, the question that still remains is this: do all these opposition forces, no matter how weak they are, represent only four tenths of one percent of the people of Sudan?

8592

CSO: 4504/449

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

SABBATH BUSING CONTROVERSY--With the opening of the bathing season, the Hovevei Hayam Company, that is connected with the Dan Company, has begun to operate the Dan buses on the Sabbath from the city neighborhoods in Tel Aviv to the beach during the daytime on the Sabbath, with stops at the regular stations. According to the Religious Front in the municipality, this constitutes a violation of the status quo in Tel Aviv regarding transportation on the Sabbath, and the Sabbath is being publicly desecrated on the main roads by the Dan Company without a permit and against the law. The Religious Front in Tel Aviv has sent an appeal in a telegram to the prime minister and has requested an urgent meeting in order to insure that the Sabbath in Tel Aviv will be properly observed and in accordance with the basic policy lines. An appeal was also sent to the minister of transportation to instruct the Dan Company, that is subsidized by the government, to terminate the runs on the Sabbath by the leasing of buses to its subsidiary, an action which is in violation of the law. The religious faction has also appealed to the members of Knesset from the religious factions with a demand that they take action on the matter and draw the necessary conclusions from the public desecration of the Sabbath -- a violation of the coalition agreement. The religious faction in Tel Aviv will convene today in order to discuss the reaction to the increase in the desecrations of the Sabbath. [Text] [Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 10 Jul 83 p 1] 5830

NEW GAS DRILLING SITES--A private drilling contractor, the Milstein Qiduhim [Drilling] Company, will begin this week to drill for gas at ten sites in the Hula Basin at an investment cost of about \$500,000. The gas drilling will be conducted with a Nutra permit in the Hula Basin, the largest part of which belongs to the Abjac Company (45 percent) with the remainder belonging to companies such as Hana and the National Oil Company (13 percent), Paz Hipusei Neft [Oil Explorations] and Paz Consortium (23.5 percent), Sismiqa Hipusei Neft [Seismic Oil Explorations] (10 percent), Fedoil (4 percent), and Bank Leumi (4.5 percent). To date, four drillings have been made in Nutra, one of which is deep. Nutra 1 has been poor, Nutra 2 is producing water mixed with gas, and Nutra 3 and Nutra 6 have been dry. In the drilling of Nutra 6 gas was not found at the level that was targeted but rather at a higher level, and therefore, Nutra 6' [sic] was drilled and gas was found there. This gas will soon be delivered to the kibbutz of Gonen that has had the benefit of the gas in Nutra 6. The ten drillings will be done in sequence, about 500 meters from each other and will reach a depth of 150 meters. The Milstein Qiduhim Company has procured a medium-sized drilling machine in the United States for the drillings in Nutra. This company has up to now been involved in test drillings,

has conducted drillings along the lines of the [Mediterranean-Dead] Seas Canal, and is now conducting, by means of a Dutch drilling ship, drillings north of the port of Ashdod as part of its expansion project. For the purpose of the gas and oil drillings, the Milstein Qiduhim Company has entered into a partnership with Klal Hipusei Neft [Klal Oil Explorations]. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Jul 83 p 8] 5830

EXPORTS TO FAR EAST--An intensified marketing campaign to encourage Israeli exports to the countries of South Asia is planned for the coming months. This was reported yesterday by the Foreign Trade Administration in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. This year it is planned to send two delegations of Israeli manufacturers and exporters to the region, and arrangements have already been concluded for Israeli participation in two major commercial exhibitions in Singapore and Japan. Mr Yehuda 'Atzmoni, who is in charge of trade with Asia in the ministry, reported that in Singapore, Thailand, The Philippines, Hong Kong, and South Korea there is an unexploited potential for Israeli goods. This part of the world has not been adversely affected by the economic crisis that is afflicting the western world and continues its economic growth. Therefore, it is desirable to invest vigorous efforts to expand the market of Israeli products there. Mr Yehuda 'Atzmoni has also reported that special emphasis will be given to promoting exports and commerce with Singapore. Singapore serves as an industrial and commercial center for all of Southeast Asia. Commercial ties with Singapore can assure the possibilities of promoting commerce with countries in the region, the populations of which number in the hundreds of millions. It was also reported that in the first 5 months of the year the total exports to Singapore amounted to \$14 million; The Philippines -- \$2.5 million; South Korea -- \$6.5 million; Thailand -- \$6.4 million; Hong Kong -- \$54.4 million. Commodities exported to the countries of South Asia consisted of diamonds, chemicals, metal products, machinery, electrical and electronic equipment, and transport vehicles. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 7 Jul 83 p 9] 5830

NO JETS AT ELAT--The Civil Aviation Administration has issued a directive prohibiting landings and take-offs of jet passenger aircraft at Elat airfield. The Adumim Hotel, that has been built in the vicinity of the runway, is a very tall building and is a hazard to large jet aircraft. The Ministry of Transportation claims that the hotel was constructed without the requisite building permits. The ministry is now considering submitting a complaint to the police and filing suit in court against the hotel owners. The directive will adversely affect charter flights that have customarily used Elat airfield at night, and it is likely to cause serious losses in the international flight and tourist connections of Elat. The deputy mayor and the person responsible for tourism, Shmuel Tagar, stated in response that he has never heard of the problem. He complained that matters involving construction irregularities are reported to the press before they are brought to the attention of the municipality. [by Reuven Pedahtzur] [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 10 Jul 83 p 1] 5830

INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS DOWN--In the first half of 1983 the industrial exports of Israel declined by 10 percent, agricultural exports declined by 12 percent, whereas the export of diamonds increased by 14 percent. In June a slight recovery was felt in the export of goods, and it amounted to \$385 million.

In contrast to June of last year, this represents an increase of 5 percent; however it must be remembered that in June of last year the war in Lebanon broke out, and exports in this month were relatively low. An analysis of the items of export also indicates that the main improvement took place in the export of diamonds and not in industrial exports. Industrial exports without diamonds increased in June of this year by less than 1 percent in contrast to industrial exports in the same month of last year. Agricultural exports declined in June by 41 percent in contrast to June of last year. Only in the export of diamonds was there a real increase, an increase of 43 percent in contrast to June of last year. Without diamonds, the total in the first half of the year was \$1.522 billion as opposed to \$1.753 billion in the same period last year. This 10 percent decline reflects a decrease in most of the branches of industry except for mines and quarries where there was an increase of 11 percent. Declines were registered in metals and electronics - 18 percent; textiles, clothing, and leather - 12 percent; wood, paper, and print - 13 percent; chemicals, rubber, and plastics - 7 percent. The statistics indicate a trend of decline in industrial exports (without diamonds) from the last quarter of the past year. In the second quarter of this year, industrial exports, without diamonds, were lower by 7.5 percent in contrast to the same period of the [past] year. A spokesman for the Ministry of Industry and Commerce said that statistics of the exports for June of this year indicate an end to the decline in exports although it is too early to draw any conclusions regarding future developments only on the basis of the statistics for 1 month. He noted that in the export statistics for last month, the effect of the government's policy of encouraging exports and maintaining profits has been felt to a certain extent. The effect of the change in the negative trends in the international economy is also being felt. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 10 Jul 83 p 4] 5830

CSO: 4423/160

IRAN

FUNCTIONS OF GUARDS MINISTRY, WAR, TUDEH PARTY, KURDISTAN

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 28 Jul 83 p 14

[Interview with Minister of Revolutionary Guard Mohsen Rafiqdust by KEYHAN; date and place not specified]

[Text] KEYHAN City Service: In an exclusive interview, Mohsen Rafiqdust, the minister of the Revolutionary Guard, responded to the questions of the KEYHAN correspondent on various topics. In this interview, he explained the duties of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard, the rate of success in carrying them out, the future of the war and the Kurdistan issue, the Tudeh Party, the reappointment of Hojjat ol-Eslam Taheri Khorramabadi as the representative of the imam in the Guards Corps and the rule of martyr Mohammad Borujerdi in the Guards Corps. The text of the interview is provided here for our readers.

[Question] What necessitated the establishment of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard and what are the duties of this Ministry?

[Answer] After the rapid and extensive growth of the Guards Corps and its decisive role as one of the determining factors in the war and also after the mobilization force was combined with the Guards Corps, the Majlis, as the institution heading all the powers, felt that it should have closer relations with the Guards Corps, as did the government, as the executive power which includes the Guards Corps. The Guards Corps itself also felt that in order to carry out its mission and for the sake of better management, it required closer contact with the three branches. These needs, at a time when the bylaws were being discussed, resulted in the decision to establish the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard with a description of certain duties written

in the bylaws of the Guards Corps. Based on these bylaws, the Guards Corps consists of two areas of responsibility: one is the command and the other the ministerial center, for each of which separate responsibilities have been projected.

In the supreme council of the Guards Corps, which is the decision making authority within the Guards Corps, the minister of the revolutionary guard is a principle member without whom no official council meeting can be held, in the same way that without the commander-in-chief or his representative as well as the honorable representative of the imam, no such meeting can be officially held. In other words, the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard is an organization within the great Guards Corps with different responsibilities. All of the military, operational, intelligence and security matters as well as such implementary matters fall within the jurisdiction of the command center and the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard is a support for the command. Providing necessities, maintaining contact between the Majlis and the Guards Corps and between the Guards Corps and the government, defending the Guards Corps before legal authorities and any related task required by the Guards Corps in these areas are responsibility of the ministerial section and we have no major problems in our dealings with the Guards Corps.

[Question] Has the establishment of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard not altered the revolutionary nature of the Guards Corps?

[Answer] The answer to this question has frequently been given by both the imam and President Khamene'i. Being revolutionary does not necessitate being lawless or without order. After receiving the vote of confidence from the Majlis, when I wanted to establish this Ministry, I consulted all the prominent people of the country, including the imam, Ayatollah Montazeri, Mr Khamene'i, Mr Hashemi, and the prime minister, asking: "In your opinion, considering the revolutionary spirit of the Guards Corps, how am I to establish this Ministry?" The general understanding of all these beloved people was that we should manage the Guards Corps with a revolutionary and law-abiding spirit. During the eight months since the establishment of the Ministry, we have not had many problems. The Guards Corps has never wanted nor does it now want go against the law. Certain duties have been determined for the Guards Corps which it must carry out. If it is thought that with the establishment of the Ministry, the Guards Corps will deviate from these duties, rest assured that those in charge of the Guards Corps and the honorable commander of the Guards Corps have no desire for such a situation.

A Revolutionary Ministry

And it should not be thought that with the establishment of this Ministry, those relations which opened the way for the Guards Corps will be reduced or that the process for getting the work done will be weakened. No, with the aid and guidance of our elder brothers, Mr Khamene'i, Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani and the prime minister, we intend to create a revolutionary ministry. We maintain that to date, bureaucracy has not been created in the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard.

Also, one of the goals that we intend to implement with the help of the brothers on the supreme council of the Guards Corps, one which the authorities also stress, is to try to maintain relations based on the revolutionary spirit of the individuals forming this Ministry so that it can be held up to other government organizations as proof that without following the traditional ways of the ministries, work can be accomplished within the laws. For example, in one instance, we compared the accomplishment of a similar task between the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard and another ministry. And in this Ministry, the work did not take 26 days. That is, we wrote a letter to an official and followed the proper procedures. We got the opinions of the proper individuals concerning the letter and by the end of the day, the positive or negative response was given to us; whereas, the same task in another ministry, going through comparable authorities, took 26 days. Also, we intend to prevent the accumulation of personnel who cause slowdowns on the job. I must say that the brothers who work here under the same conditions do the work of more than 10 people in similar ministries. We want to continue this same spirit and since most of our personnel is made up of Guards Corps members, God willing and with the help of God, the same spirit will be transferred here.

Question: How are the forces for the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard provided?

[Answer] Thus far, nearly 98 percent of the personnel of the Ministry are provided by the Guards Corps. Of course, we do not have any legal prohibitions against hiring from outside and should there be a need one day regarding the positions necessary for the administration of the Guards Corps, we will bring in committed individuals. But, the decision is that this Ministry should be the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard. We report our needs to the command section and, with all good intentions, they provide for our needs as a priority.

[Question] What organizations have been projected for carrying out the duties of the Guards Corps in the provinces?

[Answer] Thus far, no director general's office or institution has been projected for the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard. However, our duties call for some work to be done in the provinces, such as the construction of buildings for the Guards Corps or industrial self-sufficiency organizations, which we do not want to concentrate in Tehran. Hence, in order to carry out these duties, we intend to establish offices of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard within the Guards Corps of every region. Of course, if one day the need should arise, following the necessary consultations and also the law, we will take other measures. But, we think that with the cooperation which exists between the command and the ministerial centers of the Guards Corps, the establishment of an independent office is unnecessary and we ourselves are not trying to do so, because we do not consider ourselves separate from the brothers in the Guards Corps who do our work in the provinces.

[Question] One of the duties of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard is to coordinate its activities with the Guards Corps and the Majlis and also with the Guards Corps and the government. What success have you had in this area thus far?

Participation in Cabinet Sessions

[Answer] Within the framework of the projected programs, first, as a member of the Cabinet, I have participated in all the sessions of the Cabinet and have presented the proper reports and necessary information to the Cabinet. The policies decided by the government have also been applied to the Guards Corps and the problems and needs of the Guards Corps which require the approval of the Cabinet have been discussed in the Cabinet and ratified. In connection with the Majlis as well, in the course of the ratification of the bylaws of the Ministry of Information pertaining to the Guards Corps, the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard actively participated. It also participated in the course of the ratification of the security council. But, general decision making belongs to the Majlis and ratification and implementation are ultimately up to the representatives of the Majlis. At the present time, we are in close contact with the defense committee of the Majlis, which is concerned with the issue of the Guards Corps and in the sessions which are held, we discuss the problems of the Guards Corps, they give their opinions and the issues are resolved.

On the whole, after the establishment of the Ministry, with the establishment of this relationship, the Majlis and the government became more acquainted with the details of the workings of the Guards Corps and the Guards Corps became more in touch with the government and the Majlis and, thank God, work is progressing very well.

[Question] Regarding the issue of provisions, what division of responsibility has been made between the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard and the provision unit of the Guards Corps and what sort of coordination has been projected?

[Answer] Regarding the issue of provisions, there is a division of labor. In other words, the procurement and production of provisions is, on the whole, the responsibility of the Revolutionary Guard and the storing and distribution that of the Guards Corps provision unit. Hence, there is no problem. We procure and produce and then make the supplies available to the Guards corps provision unit, which stores and distributes. Every section has its own duties and there are no problems.

[Question] Considering that this Ministry has been newly established, what problems do you have at the present time?

I Do Not Feel There Are Any Problems

[Answer] In our revolution, there are no problems. Certain duties have been determined for the old and new organizations which must be carried out. I really do not feel that there are any problems with the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard for me to explain to you.

After all, it is a revolution. Circumstances call for a series of jobs to be accomplished rapidly and the rest to be done depending on the situation. Thank God, our work is progressing on its natural course and our only problem is the location of the Ministry. God willing, with the help of the prime minister, we will have a good location so that our people will be rescued from this situation of working in stalls.

Question: After the recent decree of the imam concerning the reappointment of Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Hasan Taberi-Khorramabadi in the Guards Corps and also the emphasis of the imam on the religious necessity to consider rank in the Guards Corps, what changes are projected in the Guards Corps?

Guards Corps a Military, Ideological Organization

[Answer] Hojjat ol-Eslam Taheri was previously in the Guards Corps when it was decided that he should go to Pakistan. After he came back, because of the need of the Guards Corps and the decision of the imam, he returned to the Guards Corps to direct the office of the imam's representative along with Hojjat ol-Eslam Faker and Hojjat ol-Eslam Mahallati. However, the imam's emphasis on the issue of obedience to the chain of command and consideration for rank was a strong lever for the command to manage the affairs more effectively and with more authority, within the necessary limits. Of course, the Guards Corps did not

have any problems with obstacles on its path, but the imam's decree initiated more activity and put the Guards Corps on the move. At the moment that we are holding this interview, the second phase of the Val-Fajr operations is being completed and, God willing, within the next hours, the Haj Omran barracks, which is the largest barracks in northern Iraq as well as the Haj Omran region, will be liberated by the Islamic forces. At the present time, our Reza'i is personally commanding the operations. It is the blessing of the sacred breath of the imam that whenever he gives such instructions (it must be noted that this interview took place before the announcement of the fall of the Haj Omran barracks), even though there are no problems, more progress is made. In connection with the future of the Guards Corps, as the head of the Supreme Council for Defense, Mr Khamene'i, who is in contact and has close relations with the Guards Corps, emphasized that the Guards Corps must be a military and ideological organization. He especially emphasizes the military aspect. In a military organization, ranks are essential. If there are no ranks in a military organization, all would be chaotic. The imam's decree strengthened this unity. Following this decree, considering its duties, the Guards Corps will carry out its responsibilities by obeying commands and not questioning the commander.

Question: How do you evaluate the role of martyr Borujerdi in the Kurdistan issue and how do you see the effects of his martyrdom on the Kurdistan affair?

Martyr Borujerdi Was an Axis of the Revolution

[Answer] Before speaking about the effects of the loss of our brother Borujerdi on the Kurdistan issue, I must speak somewhat about Borujerdi and the Borujerdis.

We consider all of our brothers on the battlefield as among God's chosen people. According to the sayings from 'Ali, "Holy war is a door to Paradise which God has chosen for His chosen people." This includes all our brothers who are in the battlefields. However, some of our brothers may be prominent examples, such as brothers Mohammad Borujerdi, Naser Kazemi, Hasan Baqeri, Majid Baqa'i and similar beloved brothers of whom we have a great many in the Guards Corps whom we do not know. There are a number of our brothers in the Guards Corps who, from their very appearance, seem to be the supporters of the Imam of the Era. Concerning our brother Mohammad Borujerdi, I once said to our brother Reza'i that whenever I saw Borujerdi, I felt that if the Imam of the Era was to appear, he would be one of his companions. One of his characteristics was his sincerity and purity of soul, his modesty and burning desire to serve the people. In other words, Borujerdi was a person who was the target of assassins in Kurdistan several times. Once, his body was smashed and he had a

cast over his entire body. But, when we went to visit him, he would remind us not to forget the people of Kurdistan. It is natural for one to react to what has been done to him. But, Borujerdi was above all that. If he was attacked by counterrevolutionary elements in Kurdistan, he would not lash out against the Kurdish people. His last message was that the people of Kurdistan had suffered since the creation of the Pahlavi dynasty and that even now they have no rest because of the existence of counterrevolutionaries; try to cut from other places and give to Kurdistan. Mohammad was not ambitious. During the period 21 March 1980-20 March 1981, he was nominated for the command of the entire Guards Corps, which he refused. Two or three months before his martyrdom, brother Reza'i wanted to bring him to Tehran to put him in a responsible position. But, since he was not involved in such things as making noises, he did not accept, considering his service in Kurdistan a religious duty. In regards to the effect of the loss of Borujerdi on Kurdistan, we can consider him like the martyr Ayatollah Dr Beheshti, whose characteristics and knowledge of the issues of the revolution were an axis to whom anyone from any place could go to discuss problems and return satisfied and happy. In other words, he was an axis of the revolution. But, we see that the effects of his martyrdom have been even greater than those of his life. We strongly believe that the infamous case of the hypocrites was closed with the blood of Beheshti. In the same vein, as a result of Borujerdi's martyrdom, the blood of the people of Kurdistan has been stirred and they are putting an end to the Kurdistan problem. Now, since the martyrdom of Borujerdi, the speed of operations is much greater than before his martyrdom, although it must be said that we will not find another Borujerdi. But, Borujerdi's legacy is that today we are able to launch an attack on Iraq from the area under the occupation of the counterrevolutionary elements and even become victorious. These are among the effects of the blood of martyr Borujerdi.

[Question] What is the situation with regard to the war in the south and the west in the battle with Saddam as well as in Kurdistan and how do you predict the future of the war?

The War Will Not End Without the Fall of Saddam

[Answer] The issue of the war is one which has been talked about by the authorities frequently. We will repeat what we have said without any reservations, since, as you know, what we have to say in regards to the war is what we said on the first day and we will say the same thing to the end. Do not expect us to say anything new in connection with the war. In new words, however, it can be said that the war was imposed on us; that is, they imposed it on us, and we will never end an imposed war with an imposed peace. We have been invaded and the goal of the global oppressors in starting the war against us was to once again prove

the philosophy of force, which they have tested in many countries, especially in the Arab Middle East. And they have seen that whenever Israel attacks an Arab country, it occupies territory and remains there and the Arabs accept a cease-fire. Hence, testing the philosophy of force once again, and sure of victory in this test, it attacked us. But we have decided to negate forever the philosophy of force. In one of his speeches, the imam said in regards to the war: We will never have peace with Iraq. Even if one day Iraq should accept our conditions, we will sever relations with Iraq. Hence, what most authorities say and have emphasized frequently is that our war with Iraq will not end without the fall of Saddam. Even if only for once, the aggressor must be punished. If, God willing, we end the war with military force, the suffering people of the countries in the region who are at the present time under the corrupt reactionary governments of the region, will not tolerate that corruption. The oppressed people of the world have seen that our country had a revolution and became victorious over the United States and all the Satanic powers. They have, therefore, been awakened to a degree and have come to realize that it is possible to rebel against unjust rulers. However, when the war of Iraq against Iran began, they stopped to see whether it were possible to stand up after the revolution and become victorious. The result of our victory is exactly what Fahd and Hoseyn stated in a private session at the Fez conference.

Fahd had said: If we let Iran become victorious, he will not last more than one year. And Hoseyn had said that he would not last three months. According to reliable reports, Jordan and Iraq have dug trenches along their borders. These are all facts for the attainment of which our combatants are martyred [as published].

We Will Clear the Way to Enter Jerusalem Through Iraq

If you view the war through a global perspective, it cannot be justified very well. But, if you realize what we are doing, then it becomes clear. When Begin announces that he will fight Iran half way to Jerusalem, this is a fact, because we are clearing the way to enter Jerusalem through Iraq.

With the decree of the imam stating that the way to Jerusalem goes through Karbala, Israel realized that the only government or force which will fight it is the Iranian revolution and that we might take Begin's plan seriously, because if they feel that we are becoming victorious over Iraq on the road to occupied Palestine, they will come and fight us and we will welcome it. In this war, our philosophy and goal is to prove justice and negate the philosophy of force. As you can see, our new series of operations has begun and, God willing, given our experience in two years of war, we will go into action with more confidence and

more caution so that even our progress will be calculated. Since the beginning of the defeat of the Abadan siege, we have never retreated in the war. Of course, there have been times when our victories have been 100 percent in keeping with the planned programs and times when our victories have been less than what was anticipated; but, none of our operations have failed thus far. God willing, soon, with the new changes, we will alter the apparent stagnation, which is actually due to the fact that during this period we have been engaged in reorganization, drilling and preparatory exercises, which is not stagnation. God willing, soon, with the activities and the change in the situation of the war, you will see the government of Saddam fall. But, in connection with the Kurdistan issue, at the present time, no city, village or road in this region is directly under the control of the counterrevolutionaries in Kurdistan. We purged the last road a couple of months ago. However, now a number of counterrevolutionaries are hiding in the villages of Kurdistan. But, by the grace of God and with the help of the Kurdish people and the [Muslim] Kurdish pishmargan organization, the purge in Kurdistan is rapidly progressing. By the end of this year, we should have no problems in Kurdistan.

[Question] As you know, relations between the Guards Corps and the press, which play an effective role in the people's understanding of the Guards Corps, are weak. Do you not think that this relationship must be more extensive and what do you propose in this regard?

Relations Between the Guards Corps and the People

Concerning the necessity for closer relations between the beloved nation and the Guards Corps, who are the children of this nation, it has been felt and even discussed within the Guards Corps that the people are not as familiar with the Guards Corps as they should be. Essentially, relations between the Guards Corps and the people are minimal and the people are unclear about the activities of the Guards Corps. The two years of work of the Guards Corps on the Tudeh Party has not been explained to the people--how many nights our brothers stayed awake in the sub-zero temperatures of the winter in Tehran and other cities and how during the hot days of summer they had to stand in one spot to monitor the movements of these traitors. And in these two years, they have made such progress, which, to quote an official from one of the Arab countries, has been unprecedented in the history of communism, and have issued such a blow, which has been unprecedented even on a small scale on a party or organization with such discipline, one which has a history of more than 50 years and whose leaders consist of experienced individuals from the spy organizations of the Communist countries. It would be beneficial for our nation to know the course of these events. I accept your view and believe that at a level at which things can

be told to the people, relations must be more extensive. I see the weaknesses on both sides. On the part of the Guards Corps, there are two reasons, one is being involved in the war and fighting counterrevolution. As the imam has said, most of the members of the Guards Corps who deal with the counterrevolution are the unknown soldiers who do not want to speak about what they do, not for security reasons, but for the sake of God. On the other hand, if you have tried and are unable to get an appointment with the representative of the imam or the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard, do not despair and do not give up. Efforts must be made to have an organized program to maintain constant contact. We believe that the Guards Corps must be explained to the people and the people must know more about the Guards Corps and its organization. We know that our nation praises the Guards Corps even with little information. We believe that even if the entire Guards Corps were to be sacrificed for the nation, we still will not have made up for the kindness of the people. If they knew how their beloved children serve in the Guards Corps, their love would certainly increase.

The Case of the Treacherous Leaders of the Tudeh Party

[Question] At what stage is the case of the leaders of the Tudeh Party and what percentage of the members of this Party have been arrested?

[Answer] As you know, most of the central cadre as well as the secret organization of the Tudeh Party have been arrested and all aspects of this Party are known to the brothers involved in the case. However, as for the members of the Party at lower levels, we announced that they should come forward, in which case, we would not prosecute them. A large number did so and those who did not come forward will be identified and prosecuted for ill intentions, considering the fact that the general census of the Party is at the disposal of the brothers.

Presently, the Tudeh Party case is going through the final stages and, God willing, soon, with the completion of the investigation and interrogation stages, our nation will witness the trial and punishment of these people.

But, in regard to their activities, I must say that, as you know, they were in direct contact with the Soviet spies and most certainly involved in the conspiracies against the regime of the Islamic Republic. God willing, after the investigations are concluded, more information will be provided for our beloved nation.

[Question] The seminar of the commanders of the Guards Corps was held recently. What plans were discussed in this seminar and what decisions were made?

[Answer] On the whole, in this seminar, good plans were ratified, including the Saf proposal, which is for the training of the army of 20 million which will soon begin; the Val-'Adiat plan for specialized training in the Guards Corps; the Val-'Asefat plan, which emphasizes the more rapid participation of the Guards Corps in the war and has now been implemented and the results of which our nation is now witnessing; and the plan for the Marsus foundation, which ensures the internal and external discipline of the Guards Corps brothers, the implementation of which we will soon witness.

This seminar, which was held with the national authorities, was fruitful. It was very beneficial to us and we are now witnessing the results of it in the Guards Corps.

[Question] As our final question, please tell us how you evaluate the role of the people in the progress of the war?

[Answer] As we have declared hundreds of times before, the main issue is the war and the principle factor for victory in the war is our people, both in human terms--when, for example, after his three children have been martyred at the front, a father also sends his fourth son--as well as in provisions for our fronts, which are provided by the people. We are no more than an organizer and manager. We declare that we need the help of the people 100 percent to the end of the war and the people must recognize the war as the main issue. They should not pay attention to the efforts of the enemies of the revolution to create economic shortages and should not easily overlook such things. They should support the war, on which the entire existence of the revolution and the hopes of the oppressed of the world are set, as they have done to date, and actively participate in the war as before.

10,000

CSO: 4640/317

MINISTER DISCUSSES PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES, MEDICAL PLANS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 25 Jul 83 p 23

[Text] With the establishment of the Ministry of Medicine, and the merger of the Ministry of Health and the medical schools into a single center, medical use will be made of treatment training facilities, and existing treatment facilities will be utilized for teaching. Also, with the establishment of this ministry, more manpower will be trained in medical specialties. Dr. Mohammad Hadi Manafi, Minister of Health, in an exclusive interview with KEYHAN, explained the reasons for the lack of change in the health insurance system as well as the results that came out of his trip to Cuba, in the course of announcing the item mentioned above.

He began by saying concerning the bill establishing the Ministry of Medicine: Previously, a bill prepared by the Cultural Revolution Staff concerning the establishment of a new ministry was presented, and, after revisions by the Council of Ministers, it was brought before the Majles. In the Majles, however, the bill underwent changes which forced the government to take it back, and it is now studying it.

He continued: In present circumstances, in view of the problems and shortages of medical facilities in the country, cooperation between the medical schools and the Ministry of Health is necessary. Furthermore, the country's existing medical facilities must be used for teaching, health programs, and treatment. For this purpose the government is trying to make a single center be the decision-making authority in these matters, because the existence of multiple decision-making centers causes stagnation in medical affairs.

Dr. Mohammad Hadi Manafi also added: What is clear is that we are short of technical and medical manpower. The establishment of this ministry to alleviate shortages will be a great help; it will cause more manpower to be trained in specialties to serve the medical profession. The Ministry of Health has also

formulated a plan concerning this which is being studied in the Council of Ministers. Of course, it will take several years to implement this plan.

The Minister of Health, referring to the results of his trip to Cuba, then said: This trip basically revolved around a study of health issues in that country, and how they have been dealt with; in this area there are some common facets between Cuba's revolution and our revolution, and these may be utilized for the alleviation of the shortage of medical facilities. For example, before the revolution, Cuba's medically equipped centers in the capitol and in the provinces were serving the private sector. After the victory of the revolution, the physicians left the country, and the Cuban government sent a group of young physicians to deprived parts of the country in order to alleviate shortages. Those physicians who could teach were also put to work teaching. Then they set up medical schools and rural hospitals in the provincial centers and small cities.

Dr. Manafi added: Health and medical treatment has a special importance in Cuba, such that Fidel Castro has made the Ministry of Health directly responsible for overseeing it.

Concerning Cuba's crash program to stop seasonal and contagious diseases, he said: In the area of prevention of contagious diseases, Cuba has employed people's committees and popular mobilization, and by giving hygiene priority over treatment, it has been able to eliminate contagious diseases on a wide scale. Infantile paralysis has now been eliminated, and diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, and measles have been vastly reduced. He continued: We can make the importance of the matter of hygiene clear to the people by employing the people and making use of the clergy, other revolutionary organizations, and the media; we can actually create a health army in order to reduce the need for medical facilities.

Concerning the health care seminar which was held in Cuba, the Minister of Health said: In this seminar, which was formed with the title "Health Care for Everyone Until the Year 2000," Cuba tried to portray itself as a superpower of medical care and to explain to all the participants how to popularize public hygiene. Concerning the plan for vaccinating children in Cuba, he said: In view of the small size and population of this country, the vaccination of children is being carried out decisively and with the cooperation of the people. They have set aside three days every month especially for the vaccination of children.

He continued: We can also prevent treatable illnesses within the next few years by procuring transport facilities and facilities for preserving serum.

In another portion of his talk, Dr. Manafi said concerning the recruitment of medical manpower from Bangladesh: In the past, because of the shortage of specialists, they brought in physicians from India and Pakistan without testing them, and some of them were on the low end of the scale in terms of their medical knowledge. A new procedure was adopted after the triumph of the revolution, however, and they were tested. He also said: Bangladesh has announced that there are 100 of these physicians, and they will be used after performing service in the deprived parts of the country.

Concerning the delay in the creation of a new health insurance system, the Minister of Health said: We had problems procuring the paper we needed to prepare the new account-books, and that problem has now been solved. The account-books are almost ready, and the Social Security Organization has drawn up the budget; the new health insurance system will be put into effect early in the current month.

In conclusion, Dr. Manafi said concerning this year's Hajj medical team: There are 500 personnel in this delegation; 100 of them are physicians, and the rest are medical assistance workers. All the equipment for the technical and treatment staffs has been procured, and when the transport of pilgrims to Saudi Arabia begins, the medical delegation will also be sent.

9310

CSO: 4640/307

IRAN

IRP ORGAN CLAIMS RED CROSS OFFICIAL WAS ENGAGED IN ESPIONAGE

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 27 Jul 83 p 9

[Text] Tehran - ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY - An International Red Cross Official's spying in Iran, and exchanging the names of believing Iraqi prisoners, led to a clash between Iraqi prisoners and Red Cross officials. This confrontation took place during an inspection by Red Cross Officials Monday (the day before yesterday) of a compound of Iraqi prisoners. During the clash, an international Red Cross official in Iran and an officer of the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who was trying to stop the attack by captured Iraqi believers against Red Cross Officials, were injured and beaten by angry prisoners.

According to the supervisor of the Iraqi Prisoners Commission, this Red Cross official, named X. P. Charles, obtained the names of five Iraqi believing Muslim prisoners from a Ba'thist prisoner, and promised he would turn these names over to the Ba'thist regime of Iraq in order to torment and annoy the families of these prisoners in Iraq.

Concerning this, Mr Mohammad 'Ali Nazaran, supervisor of the Iraqi Prisoners Commission, told the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY in an interview: On Monday, an unsupervised meeting between Red Cross Officials and a Ba'thist Iraqi prisoner took place, in which the Iraqi gave the names of some believing Iraqi prisoners to a Red Cross official. He insisted that these names be turned over to the Ba'thist regime in order to torment and annoy the families of these prisoners. The official promised the individual supplying the names that he would send the names to Iraq within 10 days.

He added: One of the believing prisoners snatched the paper containing the names from the Red Cross official while he was passing the prison compound and gave it to officials of the compound. Mr Jean Pierre Falme, an International Red Cross official in Iran, protested to his agent concerning this, but since this individual (Charles) was the means for transferring the names of the believing Iraqi prisoners, he became the target of the anger of the prisoners, and this led to a clash the next

day between Muslim Iraqi prisoners and Red Cross officials. He stressed that the provocation for this clash was the Red Cross agent, who was guilty of misconduct and had engaged in spying and violation of regulations.

Mr Nazaran said: Concerning this, a report supplemented by documents has been sent to the Supreme Defense Council of the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran so that the appropriate decision may be made.

He said: The believing Iraqi prisoners, in view of last year's memories, had pessimistic and suspicious feelings about the Red Cross, and they called them spies while protesting against them. According to the supervisor of the Prisoners Commission, mounting protests from the prisoners and the clash caused security officials to go into the compound and escort the prisoners peacefully to a rest area.

Last year also, a number of International Red Cross officials undertook to convey the names of some prisoners which were written on a Red Cross form during an unsupervised inspection and meeting with prisoners, which was protested by the prisoners and led to a clash between Red Cross Officials and them. As a result, one of the Red Cross officials beat one of the protesting prisoners. This clash was also quelled through intervention by officials of the prison compound. However, despite the misconduct of the International Red Cross officials outside the limits of their assigned duties, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran chose to regard this affair with Islamic tolerance and forgiveness. It went no further than to deny the aforementioned agent the right to remain in Iran.

The Prisoners Commission official, with reference to the equality of facilities for Iraqi prisoners and Iranian prison compound officials and the inhuman behavior of the Iraqi regime's officials towards Iranian prisoners in Iraq, said: So far the Islamic Republic of Iran has shown the best of intentions to cooperate with the International Red Cross, and has even left the Red Cross officials free to record the names of prisoners and to meet unobserved with them. It has only stated that as long as the established regulations are not violated, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will guarantee the safety of these officials. If, however, any of the Red Cross officials cause unrest or disturbances, the consequences of that will be called to the attention of the Red Cross. Referring to the International Red Cross's cooperation and good relations with Iran, he then said: This is exemplified by the appreciation and thanks the Red Cross conveyed to Iran in two letters. In view of this, it appears that there are suspicious elements coming to Iran disguised as members of the Red Cross who want to poison this atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation.

Noting that the names of all the Iraqi prisoners in Iran have been recorded by the International Red Cross, he then stressed that the Islamic Republic of Iran will extend the necessary cooperation to the International Red Cross, as in the past, in order to observe the Geneva Convention, on the condition that this organization not violate the regulations.

9310

CSO: 4640/308

GOVERNMENT EXERTS EFFORTS TO SOLVE 'BREAD PROBLEM'

Measures to Eliminate Bread Shortage

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 14 Jul 83 p 17

[Text] If need be, the flour ration for bakers will be increased upon the request of the Flour and Bread Council. It was also announced that the government is paying an annual wheat subsidy of 40 billion rials, and thus we should have no bread problem. Silos will work one uninterrupted shift so that trucks can be unloaded and re-dispatched to the ports.

The matters above were announced yesterday in a radio-television interview by the chief of the State Grain Organization, Mohammad Javad 'Asemipur, and Engineer Bojnud, head of the Flour and Bread Council.

The chief of the State Grain Organization compared the present wheat reserves with those of the past, and said: Following the recent order of the prime minister, the people, organizations and authorities have proclaimed their readiness to help solve the bread problem. This is an indication that the people are ready to aid the government in every area. He added: In the 21 March 1980-20 March 1981 year the government purchased only 420,000 tons of domestic wheat. Upon Iraq's imposed war against Iran, there were 40 to 50 days when absolutely no foreign wheat was imported, and some of the silos had no stock at all. However, we had no problem, nor were there repercussions throughout our society. He added: During the 21 March 1981-20 March 1982 year the government purchased about 780,000 tons of wheat domestically and in the following year about 900,000 tons. It is hoped that about 1 million tons of wheat will be purchased from the farmers during the current year. In addition, we have made foreign wheat purchases and the wheat is being imported regularly. In light of these statements, 'Asemipur added: At a time when the government is paying an annual wheat subsidy of 40 billion rials, it is not right that we should have a so-called bread problem, and we are determined to solve this problem quickly. In this connection complete cooperation and coordination have been achieved between the State Grain Organization and the Flour and Bread Council. As of Monday investigators have been stationed throughout the city and have set about controlling the situation. Furthermore, as of Sunday, silo working hours were made into one shift to facilitate the unloading and re-dispatch of trucks. Furthermore, the silos will receive whatever level of wheat they need if the Flour and Bread Council makes a request to the grain organization.

He added: The State Grain Organization head offices have been ordered to cooperate with the governor-general to immediately solve their own problems without corresponding with or getting permission from Tehran. This has been strongly stressed.

In light of the items mentioned, he emphasized: We will try to solve the bakers' problems. We will deal decisively with persons who do not show the necessary cooperation, and they will be investigated by the judiciary.

Concerning bread quality, the new head of the Flour and Bread Council, Bojnud, said: At the present time the quality of stone-baked bread is not good. In this regard we have taken the necessary actions to distribute better flour. In addition, if need be, quotas will be increased or the number of bakeries will be increased. He also said: The long lines have shortened due to the dispatch of investigatory groups to the city, and with further actions this problem will have been generally solved. Regarding the work hours of the bakeries, the head of the Flour and Bread Council said: A number of bakeries have announced their willingness to work until midnight to bake bread, and this will be done if necessary.

He stressed that bakeries can increase their work hours if necessary, and that this poses no problem from the standpoint of the Flour and Bread Council. In conclusion he asked the flour factories to deliver the back-ordered rations of bakeries immediately and to not create any difficulties in this regard.

Execution for Hoarders, Profiteers

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 18 Jul 83 p 18

[Text] Yesterday afternoon the head of the State Grain Organization and the chief of the Flour and Bread Council met with Ayatollah Yesef Sane'i, state public prosecutor and member of the Supreme Judicial Council. While presenting a report on the government's actions to improve the bread supply and eliminate existing insufficiencies, they brought up cases of violations by some bakers and others involved in the supply and distribution of flour.

According to the report of IRNA's correspondent, in this meeting Ayatollah Sane'i, state public prosecutor, gave a speech in which he expressed his thanks and appreciation for the interesting step which Engineer Musavi, the prime minister, had taken in the campaign against overpricing and hoarding in the society, and also for the government's quick attention to the bread problem and to the elimination of insufficiencies in the bread supply which might have created problems for society. He also spoke about the judiciary's response to those breaking the law regarding the supply of the country's bread and flour.

Concerning the decisive reaction the courts and public prosecutor offices would show in cases of violations, the state public prosecutor said: The penalties which the law entails for overpricing, hoarding and the creation of shortages are very severe. As far as the supply and distribution of flour and bread is concerned, if an individual is observed to overprice, hoard or fail to bake all of his flour ration, or take other actions to create a bread shortage, judges

can in accordance with the law sentence the individual to 3 months to 1 year in prison or the payment of 5 to 200,000 rials fine. Under the current wartime conditions, judges can even sentence offenders to both punishments. According to the law, if an offender is found guilty of the above offenses for a second time, his license to do business can be revoked. The law even allows for his shop's administration to be entrusted to other persons under official supervision. This has no inconsistency whatsoever with the religious law.

The state public prosecutor then pointed to overpricers and offenders who, in addition to their own personal profit, are seeking to create anxiety in society, thereby hoping to inflict a blow on the revolution and the Islamic republican system, and said: If, God forbid, such persons are found planning to make society uneasy by hoarding, overpricing and creation of shortages, they will be judged corrupt, and from Islam's standpoint the punishment for the corrupt is execution.

At the end of his speech Ayatollah Sane'i pointed to the necessity for quick investigation of offenses involving the creation of a bread shortage, and said: It is obvious that our esteemed judges will give immediacy to the investigation of this type of critical offense and to the elimination of society's uneasiness, and that they will not let anything else interfere with the investigation of these cases.

9597

CSO: 4640/284

WATER, POWER SHORTAGES ATTRIBUTED TO INCREASED CONSUMPTION

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 27 Jul 83 p 4

[Text] Tabriz - ETTELA'AT Correspondent

Mr Qafuri-Fard, Minister of Energy, who has come to Tabriz to study the issues and problems pertaining to water and electric power in East Azarbaijan, explained the reasons for water and electricity cut-offs in various parts of the country.

He began by speaking of his trip to East Azarbaijan. He said: I have come to the area in order to study the possibilities for alleviating water and electricity problems in this province. We will solve the problems that can be solved; we will ask both the officials and the people to cooperate on those that cannot be solved so that, God willing, after a time the problems will be overcome.

Mr Qafuri-Fard said concerning cut-offs of water and electricity: Concerning this, there were local cut-offs in Azarbaijan and Tehran, and the real reason for them was the huge increase in consumption. In Tehran, compared to last year, we had a 27 percent increase in the consumption of water and electricity, and in Azarbaijan the increased consumption of electricity in the last three or four months alone has been around 50 percent. Naturally, we cannot keep up with growth as rapid as this. The people must economize. Another reason is that there is a severe shortage of power in Azarbaijan, which, for all its size, has no main power station; moreover, it is situated at the end of the power lines, and there is also a certain amount of voltage drop. In any case, no matter how fast we increase power output, consumption outpaces us. I hope, however, that when the Tabriz power station goes into operation in five years, these problems will be overcome.

With regard to water, increased consumption is also involved. We have taken steps in Azarbaijan. Some new wells have been dug, and new pumps have been installed, and it appears that the situation is better. Concerning the question of whether employees in the utility offices were behind the cut-offs of water and electricity, the Minister of Energy said:

I consider this a very remote possibility, and I would add that, at least in the Ministry of Energy, no one has the nerve to commit sabotage, and there is no one interfering in this. Our statistics and figures show that the growth in consumption is very great. The levels of production for this year and last year are also shown, and this shows we had greater production in both water and electricity this year than last year, but it is clear that the consumption of water and electricity greatly increased. It is also true that this area was very deprived in the past. The Ministry of Energy wrote to the Council of Ministers and the Plan Organization about this three or four years ago and specified two dangerous areas, one of them Azarbaijan and the other Khorasan. We always said that if this situation were to continue the problem of water and electricity would turn into a disaster, because Azarbaijan, as big as it is, has no main power station.

The Minister of Energy added: We have a short-range plan and a long-range plan in mind for this area. In the short run, we are looking at the Sufian power plant, which we have succeeded in purchasing after two years of correspondence. Unfortunately, however, there are problems with transporting it, but those will also be dealt with soon.

The Tabriz power station is being looked at for the long-range plan, and its plant has been activated. Therefore, not only is there no one in the Ministry of Energy, God forbid, who wants to disturb the people, but our brothers are working loyally and wholeheartedly to solve these problems.

The Minister of Energy addressed a message to his compatriots concerning the consumption of water and electricity: In view of the country's limitations, even if we weren't faced with restricted sea port capacity and restricted amounts of currency, we would still be in no position to cope with a 25 percent growth in the consumption of water and a 50 percent growth in electricity consumption in Azarbaijan. No system in the world can support this much growth in the consumption of water and electricity in a single year. Therefore, if we really want to avert disaster, the people certainly must economize on the consumption of water and electricity.

In conclusion, the Minister of Energy said concerning the counterrevolution's misuse of the shortage of water and electricity: In Tehran and in the Afsariyeh area, we are certain that people outside the Ministry of Energy were involved in the events that took place, and they found a good opportunity to cut off the electricity in order to misuse this situation. Of course, we must say that the power failure was 100 percent accidental, the result of a transformer catching fire, and those

counterrevolutionaries, many of whom were caught, found a good opportunity to take advantage of the situation. In my view, these plots can be thwarted, God willing, with the vigilance of the people and cooperation from the water and electricity officials. We are working devotedly in our attempt to provide the maximum amount of resources; the people must also be aware that our resources are limited, and that we are not in a position to provide more resources than this. They must therefore economize a certain amount so that we can continue to operate.

9310

CSO: 4640/311

U.S. ACCUSED OF PROFITING FROM PREPARING FOR GLOBAL CONFLICTS

Karachi AMN in Urdu 22 Jun 83 p 2

[Article by Aslam Abbasi: "Why Does U.S. Want War? America Was the Only Country to Profit From World War II; Jewish Entrepreneurs Have Converted U.S. Economy into a War Economy; in the Past 37 Years, U.S. Has Interfered 262 Times in the Affairs of Others"]

[Text] People all over the world hate war intensely because history and experience have proved that war brings destruction. It kills, maims and destroys millions of humans and annihilates in seconds the results of centuries of human creative efforts. War paralyzes the economies of the countries involved and creates new social and economic problems and numerous difficulties and hardships.

Realizing that hatred and disgust toward war and war hysteria is increasing among the people of the United States, Europe and elsewhere, even religious leaders have decided to abandon their old vocation of instigating people all over the world to fight each other. That is why Christian leaders who in the past forced humans to shed each others' blood over several centuries of fighting in Crusades have now formed a front opposed to war in the United States, Latin America, Europe and Africa and support peace.

The surprising thing is that at a time when humanity is tired of war and most governments, especially the governments of socialist and nonaligned developing countries, are trying to save the world and humanity from nuclear war and are engaged in promoting peace, the U.S. ruling class, with its vested interests, is trying its best to defeat these efforts for peace, fanning war hysteria, preparing for a limited nuclear war and trying to turn outer space into an arena of conflict and war.

One can get an idea of the war-loving policy of American vested interests and the schemes of this class for spreading worldwide conflict and war from the report published in the American periodical U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, which notes that since 1946, U.S. troops have been employed on 262 occasions in domestic conflicts or external wars of foreign countries. Of the 262 occasions, noteworthy incidents include the use of U.S. troops against the people of Turkey in 1946; in the German Federal Republic in 1948; against North Korea in 1950;

against Egypt in the 1956 Suez War; against Cuba in 1961; against the people of Vietnam in 1964; against the Dominican Republic in 1965; against the Palestinian Fedayeen in Jordan in 1970; against the people of Bangladesh in 1971; against the Arab countries in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; in the Gulf in 1980 against the Iranian revolution; against the people of Ecuador in 1981; in the Sinai in 1982; against the Palestinian Fedayeen in the 1983 Lebanese-Israeli war and in the 1983 Sudan-Libyan conflict.

According to the report, the longest intervention ever undertaken by the United States was in Vietnam and other countries of Indochina. American troops fought the inhabitants of this area for nearly a decade. Thousands of American soldiers were killed, thousands were wounded and nearly 4,000 were reported missing in action. According to another U.S. periodical, NEWS-WEEK, the most dangerous interference undertaken by U.S. troops in international affairs in the history of America was in Iran on 24 April 1980, when U.S. commandos were sent in six helicopters to rescue the American Embassy employees being held hostage in Iran. While this unsuccessful mission was under way, 97 F-111 planes armed with nuclear bombs sat at an American airfield with their engines running, ready to launch a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union should it come to Iran's aid. But American helicopters and transport planes taking part in the mission were recalled after they accidentally crashed into each other, and the danger of nuclear war was averted.

These incidents reveal how interested the U.S. ruling class is in war. Their enmity toward peace and their love of war is not without cause because this class profited economically from World War II, and during its 6 years, U.S. entrepreneurs increased their wealth many fold.

World War II, between the allied countries led by Britain, France, the United States and Russia on one side and the Berlin Pact countries of Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan on the other side, lasted from 1939 to 1945. Sixty-one countries of the world took part in the war. Nearly 50 million persons were killed; 30 million were maimed, wounded or rendered helpless; of the 50 million killed, 28 million were civilians, many of whom were women, children and old people. The beautiful cities of participating countries were left in ruin and these countries suffered huge human and financial losses. Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan, Germany and other countries involved in the war lost 30 to 55 percent of their national wealth. The journal INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS quotes the book "History of World War II" to the effect that whereas other imperialist countries suffered economic ruin in World War II and Russia lost one-third of its national wealth, the U.S. profited handsomely from the war and its national wealth nearly doubled in the 6 years that the war lasted.

European countries suffered serious losses in the war; bombing destroyed or paralyzed their war and nonwar industries. Obtaining oil and raw material to run the few industries left undestroyed posed a serious problem for these countries because the war had destroyed ocean transportation. The United States on the contrary, was left largely unscathed by the war; and perhaps because of its distant location or the wrong war strategy of the Berlin pact countries, the United States escaped aerial bombing. Also, the United States had its own oil resources and a certain amount of raw materials; and it could easily import the raw materials it needed from Latin America.

These were the circumstances that allowed American industries to develop; and U.S. entrepreneurs gained control of international trading market. Taking unfair advantage of the industrial helplessness and wartime needs of European countries, the United States sold them its manufactured goods, especially war weapons, at whatever prices it wished to charge and reaped huge profits. Since the war created a great demand for weapons in the commercial market, and the profit obtained from the sale of weapons was many times greater than that derived from the sale of other goods, U.S. entrepreneurs utilized their profits to develop the weapons industry in their country. Thus, the U.S. economy was gradually turned into a military economy.

As a result of the severe military and economic losses suffered by the imperialist countries of Europe in World War II and the economic profit derived by the United States, and because of the development of military industries in the United States, it emerged from the war as the world's greatest economic and military power and became the leader of the imperialist camp.

U.S. entrepreneurs with vested interests had profited so handsomely from the sale of war weapons and had acquired such a taste for profiting from the war that even after it ended they applied themselves to promoting war hysteria and inciting other countries to fight against each other in order to pave the way for the sale of their weapons. Hence, since the end of World War II, CIA conspiracies have been behind 98 percent of all incidents of warfare between different countries. Greedy for higher profits, U.S. entrepreneurs paid less attention to peacetime industries and invested primarily in war industries. On the other hand, seeing the high profits to be gotten from war industries, U.S. entrepreneurs in nonmilitary industries such as electronics, chemicals, etc. began to reorganize their industries in a way that would make them auxiliaries to the military industries. The entire U.S. economy has thus assumed the characteristics of a war economy.

Under present conditions, American interests lie in having developing countries fight each other and in capitalist countries remaining entrenched against socialist countries so that American weapons will continue to find buyers. The United States sold \$17.5 billion worth of weapons in 1980. With the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran, civil war in Afghanistan and strained relations between Egypt and Sudan on the one hand and Libya on the other, the sale of American weapons increased to the extent that in 1982 the U.S. sold almost \$28 billion worth of arms. This proves that war is as important to U.S. entrepreneurs as rain is to farmers.

9863

CSO: 4656/215

/ EDITORIAL NOTES INDIAN 'CUNNING,' AMERICAN 'WEAKNESS'

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 17 Jul 83 p 10

[Editorial: "Indian Trickery, American Weakness"]

[Text] Senator Hatch, a close ally of President Reagan and a prominent Republican, complained in an interview with the TIMES OF INDIA that India has backed out of buying arms from the United States in response to Russian pressure. To illustrate his point, he mentioned a deal for heavy machineguns that was almost sealed when India lost interest in it. The complaint by this American statesman actually results from the weakness of the U.S. Government precipitated by the Hindu-loving Jewish lobby. It shows the impetuosity of Washington and the cold shoulders of India. The Indian leaders have become past masters at taking advantage of such situations.

Because of India's geographic location and population, the United States has always tried to please India at any cost. Actually, India has become a partner of the USSR, as seen in their mutual defense pacts in the name of friendship and peace, arms sales, economic aid and political and diplomatic cooperation. Every time India needs anything from Russia, it first approaches the United States and just before a deal is struck, it succeeds in getting better terms from the USSR, leaving the Americans stunned.

This drama was successfully enacted twice in one year. Last year, an Indian delegation preceded Mrs Gandhi's trip to the United States and all but sealed a deal to buy long-range artillery and other arms.

However, when President Reagan arranged for India to obtain nuclear fuel from France, this deal was cancelled. Now, India needs spare parts for its Tarapore nuclear plants, set up with American aid, and it pulled the same trick of buying arms again. When George Shultz, U.S. secretary of state, promised to take care of it during his trip to New Delhi, the deal to buy American machineguns was not consummated. The trickery and the cunning of Indian leaders needs no elaboration, but this weakness of American leaders is also unparalleled. After being repeatedly betrayed, they are still offering help.

7997

CSO: 4656/224

PAKISTAN

ELECTIONS INCLUDING POLITICAL PARTIES URGED

Karachi AMN in Urdu 17 Jul 83 p 2

[Text] The interview President Ziaul Haq had with the Japanese newspaper ASAHI SHIMBUN before his departure for Japan is of considerable importance in many respects.

The president believes that the elections are not far off. In the meantime, he said, attention will be given to improve the process of molding the structure of the country on the basis of democracy in accordance with Islamic principles. Continuous dialogue will help to develop political leadership, political parties will become strong and their structure will improve, after which elections will be held.

At the outset, dates have been announced for holding municipal elections in the country. These are expected to be completed by the end of September in various parts of the country. Municipal bodies will not be able to begin working again much before 14 August when, as the president has reiterated, the new political structure of the country will be announced. This declaration will take final shape only after reports on the political structure completed by various committees are studied by the government commission, which in turn will submit its report to the president.

As already stated, the commission will have completed its work on 31 July. The president will have a week to 10 days to study the report and arrive at a conclusion and only then can an announcement be made. If the commission takes a longer time to study the reports, it will be impossible for an announcement to be made on 14 August and the commission will have to be given more time, with the result that there will be no change in the situation. The only difference will be that the municipal institutions will have started working and together with this there will also be gradual changes in the political structure. It is quite possible that later on there may be suggestions that the representatives of the municipal institutions, having also been elected by the people, could be asked to give their opinion on the political program. This situation may be tolerated to a certain extent by the political parties, which the president has repeatedly affirmed are not organized, are not elected representatives of the people and are not strong. Everyone knows that if general elections were to be held regularly at

specified times, then political parties would automatically become strong and their structure would continue to improve. Unfortunately, the democratic political process in Pakistan has been disrupted due to repeated enforcement of martial law in the country. Weren't political parties strong in Pakistan when President Ziaul Haq announced that he would hold general elections after taking control of the country from the elected civil government on 5 July 1977? Weren't political parties strong on 17 November 1979 when he promised to hold elections for the second time and 1 month earlier on 16 October 1979 when he not only cancelled elections but also outlawed political parties and enforced censorship on newspapers? How can you expect political stability when political leaders are detained, political workers are arrested and politicians are restricted from going from one province to another and one city to another? Be as it may, historical facts belie these claims. Political parties have always contributed their full share in times of difficulty and even now they are in a position to prove this. Challenging some one to fight after tying their hands and feet is no indication of political maturity.

Whether elections are far off or close at hand, political parties and strong leadership depend on this process. There is no need to introduce a new political structure to attain this goal. The experience of the past 6 years of rule must have proved to the ruling junta that by outlawing political parties, the parties are not weakened but on the contrary become more and more united every day. Their unity contributes to the country's safety and security and to an end to martial law in the country. They demand that a date be immediately announced for holding general elections on the basis of a political structure as already envisaged in the existing 1973 constitution. Any further delay or loss of time in any new experiment can be detrimental to the federal structure. The preparation of reports and appointment of commissions to study them are merely delaying tactics. Precious time is being lost. The best thing would be to restore the 1973 constitution instead of devising an interim constitution and announce to the people a timetable for elections. If this announcement is made on 14 August, then it will be considered a good omen.

The government should also consider whether it will be necessary to take the political leaders into its confidence about the dangers of the political and geographical situation prevailing in the country. A military government cannot expect to resolve the internal and external problems facing the country by outlawing political parties. Over the past 6 years the country's problems have, if anything, multiplied and not diminished. The best thing would be to enter into a dialogue with political leaders and come to a lasting political solution that would guarantee a strong and democratic foundation for the country.

9315

CSO: 4656/226

EDITORIAL HITS INCONSISTENT JAILING, EXPULSION OF POLITICIANS

Karachi JANG in Urdu 20 Jul 83 p 3

[Editorial: "Detention and Expulsion from State"]

[Text] According to a recent news report, members of the Punjab police surrounded the house of a leader of a defunct political party and insisted on arresting him without even showing a warrant for his arrest. Party officials and his colleagues were told that he was being arrested because of a warrant issued by the Rajan Pur police after he left that district despite the restrictions imposed on him. The Sind court, however, had nullified a request for his expulsion from the state. It had been told that since this political leader moved from Rajan Pur to Karachi, his colleagues and followers had been punished, or at least action was under way in this regard.

We have noted this to show the kind of political unrest or government disruption could happen because of orders to jail, expell from a state or confine to one district the leaders of defunct political parties. These can be a negative influence on public opinion at home and abroad. At this point, we do not want to go into the legal, moral or national aspect of these orders but would like to say to deprive these political leaders of their fundamental right to freedom of movement in their country, a right which all citizens should have, is not an exemplary or acceptable act. Putting restrictions on countrymen for administrative reasons is nothing more than making a good case for disgracing our country in the eyes of the world.

Another factor that came to our attention is that this system of jailing someone or expelling them from a state is not being implemented consistently. The political parties that strongly oppose the present government are being treated more harshly. The leaders of other banned political parties are not only allowed free movement in their beloved country but are also given opportunities to publish their views. Similarly, political leaders and people in power are busy in publishing their political views and beliefs as is evident from our official and nongovernment media. All this shows that the use of this system to weed out their enemies is not taken lightly by the people. These political leaders on whom restrictions are being imposed are becoming national figures; they are becoming more popular and better known.

Therefore, as we have often urged in these columns, these political leaders whose crime or the lack of it is not clear to the masses and who have been in jail for a long time, should be freed immediately and the orders expelling them from their states or cities should be rescinded. This would provide all countrymen equal right to movement within the country, a right that belongs to them. This would pave the way for national unity. People in various parts and states of the country will be able to associate and communicate better. After all, this is one of the goals of the present government. This would also discourage the prevalence of unequal rights, about which a scene occurred recently between a federal minister and his old political opponent.

In our opinion, if our federal and state governments are hesitant about implementing these liberal steps for some administrative reason, they should cancel these orders for jail or expulsion simply to foster an atmosphere of goodwill and to change the present tense feelings. It is important for the announcement to be made on 14 August. Some moderate political leaders also have given this same kind of advice to the federal government.

7997

CSO: 4656/228

PAKISTAN

TRUE DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS NEEDED TO AVOID REPLAY OF HISTORY

Karachi AMN in Urdu 15 Jul 83 p 2

[Excerpts] Whatever the reason for the separation of East Pakistan, one fundamental cause was that the treatment meted out to this province, which formed the vanguard of the Pakistan movement, resembled that of a new mother toward her stepchild. Not only were the people in that province deprived of their political rights and not accorded due regard for constituting the majority but at the same time they were also deprived of their economic privileges as well. The official bureaucracy in West Pakistan, politicians and capitalists, besides establishing their monopolistic control over East Pakistan also badly exploited this majority province.

The greatest proof of the exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan is that Pakistan's national budget today stands at 82 billion rupees, whereas that of Bangladesh is only 15 billion rupees. Our defense budget this year has been increased by another 3 billion rupees, thus increasing our annual defense budget from 22 billion to 25 billion rupees. In other words, the amount allocated for our defense is 10 billion rupees in excess of the total national budget of Bangladesh.

Pakistan today consists of four provinces, Punjab, Sind, Frontier and Baluchistan. Among these provinces the budget of the Punjab alone is 14.48 billion rupees, which is equivalent to that of Bangladesh, whereas the population of the Punjab is only one-third that of Bangladesh.

This year, 4.45 billion rupees has been allocated for the Sind budget, 3.63 billion rupees for the Frontier Province and 1.85 billion rupees for the Baluchistan budget.

If Pakistan's national wealth had been distributed justly and East Pakistan had not been exploited economically, then Bangladesh's budget, if it had not been bigger than that of Pakistan at least would have been equal to it or there would not have been such a great disparity as exists today. In other words, compared with the 82 billion rupees that Pakistan can afford to spend, Bangladesh would not have to restrict its expenditure to 15 billion rupees. In the defense sector it has just managed to bring its budget to 2 billion rupees by increasing it 29 percent. Compared with this, we are able to

increase our defense budget from 22 billion to 25 billion rupees, an increase of 3 billion. Just as we have a common border with India, so has Bangladesh. We have always increased our defense budget by making a bugbear out of India, whereas Bangladesh does not indulge in such acts. The people of Bangladesh strongly protested the 29 percent increase in the defense budget and their finance minister had to hasten to explain that the additional amount was intended not for the purchase of modern weapons but for increasing the number of soldiers and their salaries.

If with a 25-billion-rupee defense budget we still feel insecure vis-a-vis India how is it that Bangladesh with a meagre defense budget of 2 billion rupees does not feel threatened by India? Bangladesh has not bought as much arms and ammunitions in the past 11 years as we did in just 1 year. Second, it does not have as many modern weapons as we do. If our security is dear to the United States and it has offered Pakistan military planes like F-16's, then why isn't Bangladesh's security equally important to the United States, and why doesn't the United States provide Bangladesh with modern weaponry? Could this perhaps be attributed to our readiness to work for U.S. interests whereas Bangladesh is not prepared to be a U.S. stooge?

The elder statesmen of some of the insignificantly small political parties have been saying that the People's Party is responsible for killing democracy and is the standard-bearer of dictatorship. Mian Tufail Mohammad, leader of the defunct Jamaat-e Islami, has said the same thing. Mian Tufail Mohammad, in order to pacify the people who are restless to start a movement, has also been saying that President Zia is making preparations to transfer power to the people. I would like to ask only one thing of elder statesmen speaking in this fashion; if General Zia, in keeping with his promises, were to hold general elections on the basis of established democratic traditions and if the People's Party were to win the elections by an overwhelming majority, would these elder statesmen accept the results of these elections and force the army to transfer power peacefully, or would they reject the election results and try to stop the People's Party from taking power and thus repeat the same drama they played in East Pakistan? If they have decided that they will accept only positive results and will never accept disagreeable results, then history will most certainly repeat itself, and God protect Pakistan. If our statesmen and rulers have gone to such extremes that they are not prepared to accept the verdict of the majority and are bent on imposing their wishes every way they please then we can never have democracy in our country and just as once no power was able to prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan, similarly no power will be able to guarantee the security and integrity of Pakistan.

9315

CSO: 4656/226

MRD, PEOPLE'S PARTY CRITICIZED FOR ANTI-PAKISTAN POLICIES

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 11 Jul 83 p3

[Article by Chaudhary Abdul Hamid: "Unwise Politics"]

[Excerpts] My arguments in this article should not be taken to imply support of the present government, since I have some complaints against it, too. Pakistan is our only and last refuge; we must make clear that in opposing this government we do not mean to invite our enemies to take over. It has happened in Afghanistan and now the people of Afghanistan find it impossible to get rid of those "helpful friends." Such "guests" come to stay. I believe that patriotic political parties should cooperate with the government in order to alleviate the present disrupted state of affairs. This applies specially to Maulavis. They should think coolly and not take this suicidal path. The People's Party and the NDP have relations with India and the USSR such that it can be assumed that we could not expect the Islamic character of Pakistan to survive if these parties took over. Our freedom would be just like they have in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Afghanistan, if not worse. The way the leaders of these two parties apologize to and support India and the USSR indicates that their designs are dangerous. As soon as these parties take charge, Russia and India will begin to interfere in our internal affairs. The influence and prestige these parties hold stems from the internal strife among the patriotic parties. Once this strife is taken care of, these parties will lose their influence.

Mr Smirnov, the Russian ambassador, said recently that "the American secretary of state carried an alarm about the Russian threat in his briefcase, even though no such danger exists." Interestingly, President Zia is already aware of what Secretary Shultz has in his briefcase. He knows the expansionist designs of Russia. We did not make any pact of friendship with Russia for this reason. History tells us that Russia makes friends with a country before devouring it. There are numerous examples showing that the Russian bear does not leave its victim until the last drop of blood is taken. I ask my countrymen to be wise and prudent and not to fall prey to the Russian snake oil salesmen. Later, it would be useless to cry over spilt milk.

Aggressive efforts are underfoot in our country to effect an atmosphere conducive to interference by India and Russia. They want to solve the political problem of Pakistan before solving the one in Afghanistan. The People's Party

and the NDP are both favorite parties of these two countries and support them openly and secretly. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was sent from Afghanistan for this special mission. For this same purpose, Bhutto and his followers were given a royal welcome in Delhi and Kabul. In India, in exchange for some future services, some real property was reinstated to Bhutto. The details of this affair are included in the White Paper published about the Bhutto regime.

One result of these Indo-Soviet efforts is the MRD and its open support of Russian policy in Afghanistan; it never condemns Russian actions. The 31-point program of this party organizes Pakistan into linguistic and geographic regions. Two small parties made friendly objections to this and they were told to live with their suspicions. The MRD told them that it does not have to agree with them since every party has a right to its own independent ideology. The MRD, however, is full of parties with linguistic and geographic political mentality. Khawaja Khairuddin's Muslim League is one of them. The recent statement by the present leader of the MRD, Sardar Sher Baaz Mazari, indicates that this 31-point program is the political manifestor of the MRD.

We have to give credit to the People's Party for its hard work in bringing about the present situation. It has formed an alliance with all parties except the Muslim League (Pagara group), Jamaat-e Islami and Khaksaar Party (Ashraf Khan group). Jamaat-e Islami has now adopted a shameful and negative attitude. The first stance of Jamaat was to openly oppose the so-called democratic movement of the MRD, but it seems that as the result of Prof Ghafoor Ahmed's efforts, they want to keep quiet at this crucial time. In other words, they do not want to disrupt the efforts of the pro-India and pro-USSR parties. Prof Ghafoor Ahmed and Maulana Noorani should be the favorite persons in the People's Party because both of them consider Bhutto's era better than Zia's era.

7997

CSO: 4656/224

END